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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical
Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their
preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF￿s International
Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/
IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research
papers for the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary
and Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and
financial issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000
the studies are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International
Development at Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Government of
Denmark, as well as contributions from the countries participating in the meetings of
the  G-24.vii The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
Abstract
Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of
managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other
developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences
of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and
reveals its shortcomings.
The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring,
corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia
were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what
extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making
capacity.
Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced
to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally
weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their
activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis.
There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the
Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a
country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms
to strengthen the financial sector.
Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms
focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and
more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a ￿one-size-fits-all￿
programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between
the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately,
can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank
ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover,
attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall
recovery of the domestic economy.
The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of
necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are
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The causes of the Asian crisis have been widely
analyzed to date and as the story unfolded, the
assessments and consensus with regard to the appro-
priateness of responses and longer-term restructuring
issues have also changed. The various IMF pro-
grammes that the crisis countries such as Indonesia
have undergone have also evolved, and the IMF it-
self has undergone introspection with regard to the
appropriateness of IMF conditionalities. It would be
true to say that we are all still in the process of un-
derstanding and learning. A consensus has yet to
emerge on how to balance the dilemma between the
conditions set to access IMF and other donor funds,
and the implementability of the programme from the
perspective of the country in question. Assessing the
latter involves a range of issues such as appropriate-
ness of the responses, ownership of the programme,
and the acceptable degree of flexibility given insti-
tutional and political constraints. Current experience,
whether it be in Indonesia or in Russia, Turkey and
Argentina, clearly indicates that required actions and
conditionalities cannot be determined without con-
sideration of governance problems, pressure from
vested interests, political pressures, weaknesses of
institutions and of the legal infrastructure.
This paper takes the experience of the Indone-
sian economic crisis, and the management thereof
through the various IMF programmes, as a case study
to demonstrate the complexity of the dilemma, the
lessons we have learned to date, and the potential
measures that could be taken. To make the analysis
more focused, we will concentrate particularly on
the banking crisis, on restructuring and on the cur-
rent process of recovery as experienced by Indonesia.
Given the intertwining of the banking, corporate and
macro stories, one must also touch on these aspects.
References to comparative experience of other cri-
sis countries, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand,
will be made.
This paper begins by reviewing the consensus
and debate, and changes thereof, that have emerged
to date on the causes of the crisis and the vulner-
abilities of the fundamental structure of these
economies which have led to a longer and deeper
crisis than would otherwise have been the case. The
debate has evolved, and as a result thinking on the
remedies to be undertaken to respond to the crisis,
to restructure, and to initiate recovery and to finally
introduce elements to prevent future crisis have also
evolved. Mistakes were made and lessons learned,
with fiscal ramifications, which will be long felt.
Indonesia was chosen as the case study due to the
author￿s familiarity with the country and also be-
cause it was the worst-hit country, and one which
continues to struggle with its bank restructuring pro-
gramme.
The second section focuses on the lessons
learned in managing banking crisis and the subse-
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quent process of rehabilitation and recapitalization.
Attention will be drawn particularly on the question
of how realistic it was to have expected countries
like Indonesia with the institutional, legal and po-
litical constraints ￿ as well as struggling with the
setting up of democratic institutions in a newly found
democracy ￿ to meet second generation Washington
consensus and international standards (including
those of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS))
of transparency and corporate governance. The key
question is how much is the ineffectiveness and slow
progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructur-
ing and continued dilemmas in macro economic
policy management in Indonesia a factor of the
wrong programme, the wrong sequence or empha-
sis and how much is due to politics, corruption and
incapacity of policy makers?
The third section assesses the way forward and
the interim steps that a country like Indonesia needs
to take. A number of suggested approaches have
emerged and basically there is now recognition of
the need for intermediate steps prior to the longer-
term goals of bank prudential regulations and
standards which approach that of developed coun-
tries. The issue of applicability to the Indonesian case
will be examined.
The main message of the paper is the impor-
tance of sequencing and pacing necessary reforms
by bearing in mind the dilemma between what is
ideally desirable, and what is doable. It is also im-
portant to design interim steps to get more ownership
and gain domestic support for the reform programme
and institutional and behavioural changes, to ensure
that the longer-term goals will be upheld.
II. Structural vulnerabilities in
banking sector pre-crisis
A. Build up of vulnerabilities pre-crisis
Three major sets of factors contributed to the
build up of vulnerabilities in the banking sector pre-
crisis. The first of these was the rapid expansion of
the banking sector after the comprehensive reforms
in 1988 that was not accompanied by adequate pru-
dential regulations and central bank supervision.
Second was the weak corporate governance in the
banking sector due to high concentration of owner-
ship. Third were the effects of the economic boom
and international financial integration, which am-
plified the vulnerabilities.
1. Liberalization and lack of a sound banking
system
Indonesia￿s financial sector liberalization was
undertaken in two stages, with the lifting of interest
rate and credit ceilings, and reduction of liquidity
credits to state banks in 1983, followed by compre-
hensive liberalization in October 1988 whereby most
of the entry barriers and various restrictions that fa-
voured certain types of banks were removed. There
was open entry for new domestic and joint venture
banks, relaxation of branching requirements for both
domestic and joint venture banks, reduction of the
reserve requirement ratios, and state owned compa-
nies were allowed to deposit up to 50 per cent of
their deposits in non-state banks.
Within a few years of the reforms there was a
dramatic increase in the number of banks and
branches, M2 growth, and credit. The number of new
banks increased from 61 in 1988 to 119 in 1991 and
the number of foreign banks increased from 11 to
29. The number of branches of private domestic
banks quadrupled from just 559 in 1988 to 2,639 by
the end of 1991. The asset quality problem and low
capital levels hindered the growth of state banks,
whilst the private banks expanded rapidly and be-
gan to overtake the state banks by 1994, in terms of
loans, deposits (for which private banks were already
ahead in 1992) and total assets. The Government
attempted to strengthen the state banks by announc-
ing plans for mergers and privatization, but only
Bank Negara Indonesia, the largest of the state banks
went public and no meaningful progress on mergers
took place prior to the crisis.
Unfortunately the rapid expansion of the bank-
ing sector was not matched by prudential regulations
and improved supervision by Bank Indonesia ￿ the
Indonesian Central Bank ￿ to deal with the dramatic
increase in the number of banks and branches. The
rapid increase in liquidity, due to the reduction in
reserve requirements and growth of M2, led to over-
heating pressures and rising inflation in the early
1990s. The monetary authorities responded by tight-
ening monetary policy, and, faced with growing
criticism and caution over the rapid expansion of3 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
the banking sector, introduced improved prudential
regulations of the banking system in February 1991,
two years after the comprehensive liberalization of
the banking sector.
The prudential regulations introduced included
a comprehensive capital, asset, management, equity
and liquidity (CAMEL) quantitative rating system.
The system included requirements for stricter quali-
fications of bank owners and managers; a schedule
to meet capital adequacy requirements (CAR) ac-
cording to the BIS standard of 8 per cent on risk
weighted assets by 1993, stricter information and
reporting requirements and stricter legal lending limit
regulations to related groups or to one individual
group. A new banking law was passed in 1992 with
strict sanctions for bank owners, managers and com-
missioners for the violation of laws and regulations
related to managing the banks. Foreigners were also
now allowed to purchase bank shares in the capital
markets and the legal status of the state banks was
changed to a limited liability company, to allow them
more autonomy and be managed as a private corpo-
ration. In October 1992, as part of the desire to limit
the number of banks, the capital requirements to set
up domestic and joint venture banks were raised by
five times for the former and by double for the latter.
Despite these regulations and regular updates
and improvements in the prudential regulations, there
were still weaknesses in the legal and regulatory
framework especially with regard to loan classifica-
tion. An even more serious problem was the lack of
enforcement of these prudential regulations due to a
combination of weak capacity and capability of bank
supervisors in the Central Bank, corruption and po-
litical interference of favoured owners close to the
centre of power. As a result violations of the pru-
dential regulations were not properly sanctioned and
non-compliance was widespread as became evident
in the audits of the banks undertaken after the crisis.
In comparison (table 1) Malaysia already ex-
perienced a banking crisis in the mid-1980s, and a
substantial reform programme which were intro-
duced after then led to recovery in the late 1980s.
This experience contributed to Malaysia having bet-
ter institutional and regulatory structure, as compared
with Indonesia or Thailand. Malaysia also differed
from these two countries by having relatively
Table 1
COMPARATIVE INITIAL CONDITIONS: INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND
Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
Foreign liability banks /
total liability (1997) 15% 7.4% 27.4%
Capital adequacy 8 % target 8 % target 8.5 % target
87 % complied Actual 11.4 % average Actual 9.8 % average
NPL / total loans (end 1997) 7.2% 5.9% 22.6%
Corporate debt (1998) $118 billion $120 billion $195.7 billion
External $67.1 billion $40 billion $32.5 billion
Domestic $50.9 billion $80.2 billion $163.2 billion
Debt equity (1996) 200% 140% 240%
Major financial institutions: 238 banks incl. 48 banks incl. 29 banks incl.
(early 1997) 10 foreign 13 foreign 14 foreign
and 39 finance co. and 91 finance co.
Deposit insurance None until explicitly None None until January 1998
unlim. in August 1997
Bankruptcy law Outdated, 1998 Modern Outdated, 1940
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stronger regulatory structure and legal framework
for corporate sector problem resolution even prior
to the crisis. For instance, Malaysia already had
modern bankruptcy laws, regulations and procedures.
Although Malaysia did not embark on a rapid
liberalization of the financial sector as did Indonesia,
and had a better legal and institutional infrastruc-
ture, Malaysia remained nevertheless vulnerable to
the crisis due to a number of reasons (Thillainathan,
2001). During the period 1990￿1997 there was rapid
expansion of credit at around 30 per cent per an-
num, overexposure of the banking system to the vola-
tile market for shares and property (estimated at over
40 per cent of the portfolio), weak management
caused by continued restrictions on hiring and com-
pensation, weak supervision due to capacity and hir-
ing constraints as well as failure of the Government
to raise the banking standards closer to international
best practices and align incentives of owners, man-
agers, depositors, and regulators to prudent banking.
The failure to meet international standards has
to do with not imposing the required rigorous stand-
ards on loan classifications and provisioning and
financial disclosure. The increasing role of banking
groups in underwriting and brokerage business in
the 1990s has also been a source of concern as these
institutions are exposed to both credit and market
risks. The requirement for risk capital for these in-
stitutions was also low.
In Thailand, the banks were related to business
groups since trade financiers, who later expanded to
become industrialists, started into banks and even-
tually these bank-centred groups became the large
industrial conglomerates whereby insider lending
had become a problem, just as in the case of Indone-
sia. The lack of proper evaluation of loans, even to
third parties, was a major problem in the Thai bank-
ing system. This lack of evaluation and monitoring
was resolved by demanding collateral in the form of
land, or property, as well as personal guarantees from
limited liability companies. In comparison, the for-
eign commercial banks operating in Thailand had to
adhere to international standards and principles ad-
vocated by headquarters and thus their lending
decisions were based on proper evaluation. The main
vulnerabilities (Vichyanond, 2001) of the Thai bank-
ing system were the lack of systemic credit risk
assessment; overexposure to credits given to affili-
ated businesses, shareholders and directors; and
speculative lending with rapid growth and concen-
tration in risky sectors such as real estate which were
vulnerable to asset price changes. These results came
about due to the lack of competition and of quali-
fied and professional bank personnel. In Thailand,
liberalization occurred by allowing entry of finan-
cial companies who were, in fact, under less stringent
rules compared with banks.
The lesson is clearly that of poor sequencing
with controls on bank liabilities being removed, such
as interest rates, but with the oversight on the assets
side and the skill and experience for assessing the
level of risk, lagging behind. The vulnerabilities that
this caused were severely underestimated by all ￿
academic analysts, advisers, policy officials and in-
ternational financial institutions. Even after the
prudential regulations were introduced and capital
adequacy standards met, information and data prob-
lems, inadequate loan loss provisioning and the
quality of loan portfolios were still a problem. In
addition to higher risk, the newly liberalized finan-
cial sector also had to contend with revolution in
technology, communications and financial engineer-
ing (World Bank 2001: 90).
2. Weak corporate governance, moral hazard
and incentive structures
Although prudential requirements and regula-
tions were introduced to address corporate govern-
ance issues such as legal lending limits, there was
overall weak banking sector governance and little
incentive for banks to review their corporate lending
carefully, or to behave in a risk appropriate way. There
were several underlying reasons for this outcome.
First is that despite the increase in the number
of banks after 1988, the banking sector remained
highly concentrated amongst a few private and state
banks. The top 10 private banks and the 6 state banks
together accounted for 75 per cent of total bank as-
sets. The number of private banks doubled to reach
164 after the 1988 bank liberalization, but concen-
tration of the sector remained high, with the top
10 private banks in Indonesia accounting for 68 per
cent of total private bank assets. However, concen-
tration in itself was not the issue; rather, it was the
lack of incentive for appropriate behaviour.
Second is concentration in majority ownership
hands, both state and private sector, which resulted5 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
in asymmetry of information for all stakeholders.
Although a number of the major private banks also
issued shares in the capital market, the original own-
ers were still holding the majority of shares, and in-
formation asymmetries (an incomplete and imperfect
information system) prevailed between the majority
shareholders and minority shareholders, investors
and creditors. Moreover, even if information disclo-
sure were required, the information given was not
necessarily accurate due to weak accounting stand-
ards and auditing practices. There were also infor-
mation asymmetry problems with bank supervisors,
as well as the weak capacity of bank supervision by
the Central Bank, including collusive practices and
instances of interference.
Despite legal lending limits to affiliated groups
or one group, there was gross violation of this re-
quirement as became evident in the post audits being
undertaken on banks taken over by the Government.
The top 10 private banks were linked to major busi-
ness as well as politically powerful groups. For
instance, two of the largest private banks ￿ Bank
Central Asia (BCA) and Bank Umum Nasional
(BUN) ￿ have shareholders linked to former Presi-
dent Suharto. Another private bank, the Bank Duta,
was known to hold the funds of the former Presi-
dent￿s foundations and of Badan Urusan Logistik
Negara (BULOG), the state logistics agency. As for
state banks, a number of the large banks, including
BNI 1946 the largest state bank, did issue shares to
the public. However, the state also still retained a
large majority and was thus still able to exert great
control over the bank. Other mechanisms to enforce
good governance over owners and managers, such
as central bank supervision and rating agencies were
not effective due to a combination of lack of imple-
mentation, and information asymmetries.
In comparison, the Malaysian banking system
is less concentrated and relationship based compared
with other East Asian countries. The structure of the
banking system is as follows: Foreign banks ac-
counted for 20 per cent of the banking system; and
government-owned or government-controlled banks
account for another 30 per cent of the market share.
The largest bank is government-owned and is pub-
licly listed. The remaining banks are privately
owned, often with private family interests. The lead-
ing local banks are mostly publicly listed, but still
have a dominant shareholder in the form of a gov-
ernment institution or private family interest.
However, the private commercial banks were mostly
not part of a conglomerate. In the Malaysian experi-
ence, prohibition of loans to related parties and
enforcement by the Central Bank of this rule ap-
peared to have been able to reduce overexposure to
large business group lending as had occurred in In-
donesia. There was also no overt directed lending
imposed by the Government on banks.
The weaknesses in the Malaysian banking sys-
tem was to found elsewhere. The promotion and sup-
port of a number of mega projects by the Govern-
ment, and lenders￿ assumption that the Government
would not let these projects fail, led to lending by
banks based on the collateral of the project as well
as implicit government guarantees, and not neces-
sarily on the viability and feasibility of the project.
Thus overinvestment, lower returns, poor cash flows
and emerging problem loans also occurred. Privati-
zation deals which were not just purely market driven
but which also aimed to fulfil the non-economic
objectives of promoting indigenous or indigenous
(bumiputra) entrepreneurs too have caused problem-
atic privatization deals and exposing the stock mar-
ket and banking industry with its overexposure to
share financing, to vulnerabilities of the crisis
(Thillainathan, 2001).
Third in the case of Indonesia, there was an
implicit government guarantee to bail out banks and
no clear exit policy. Only one bank had been allowed
to fail in the 1990s and there were cases of govern-
ment banks and private banks being bailed out as
described in box 1.
In contrast, the regulatory and incentive sys-
tem facing Malaysian banks was such that after the
1980s banking crisis, no banks, but with few excep-
tions would be rescued. However, the depositors
were implicitly guaranteed thus still creating the
problem of moral hazard. Thillainathan (2001) ar-
gues that this led to Malaysian banks having a higher
gearing ratio and higher propensity for banks own-
ers and managers to engage in risky lending than
would otherwise have been the case without such
full guarantee of depositors.
3. Macro policy and financial integration
The build up in Indonesia￿s vulnerability pre-
crisis was associated with reinforcing dynamics
between capital inflows, macro policies, and weak6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
financial and corporate sector institutions (Ghosh and
Pangestu, 1999). It should be noted at the outset that
Indonesia has had an open capital account since the
late 1960s.
In response to growing domestic pressures and
capital inflows in the mid-1990s, Indonesia em-
ployed a macroeconomic policy mix that actually
encouraged further capital. The policy mix was com-
prised of a dramatic tightening in the monetary policy
stance;1 fiscal policy which was not used in a coun-
ter cyclical way so that the burden of stabilization
fell on monetary policy and led to high interest rates;
and whilst the rupiah was under a managed float
system, its depreciation was at a predictable 5 per
cent per annum. The high cost of domestic of bor-
rowing led to offshore borrowing by corporations
which could do so, and banks often unhedged given
the predictable depreciation. The monetary authori-
ties attempted to curb expansion of liquidity through
the banking system by placing offshore borrowing
limits on banks, state related lending, and eventu-
ally non-bank financial institutions (NBFI). The three
shocks ￿ tight monetary stance, prudential regula-
tions and offshore borrowing ceilings imposed in the
early 1990s ￿ had a major impact on the banking
system. However, private corporations did not ex-
perience limits to offshore borrowing, and continued
to borrow abroad without hedging, and to fund ac-
tivities that were predominantly rupiah-based. The
high domestic interest rates also led to an increase
in deposits of non-residents or Indonesians repatri-
ating their funds domestically, thus increasing capital
inflows. In addition, in late-1995 the Central Bank
Box 1
EXAMPLES OF TOO BIG OR TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL
1. Bappindo, the state owned development bank had been having problems for many years and in the late
1980s was discovered to have a large number of non-performing loans, including a case of serious
corruption in order to obtain credit for large projects.  Instead of closing down the bank or undertaking
drastic restructuring efforts, the bank was allowed to continue to function and the sanctions to the
corruption stopped at the officers level and one business man who actually ￿escaped￿ from prison.
2. Another case was Bank Duta which was a private domestic bank that experienced large foreign exchange
losses due to currency speculation. At the time the Bank went public, in fact they were already suffering
losses due to foreign exchange positioning, but the bank still went public with fraudulent financial
statements. The bank held deposits of the State Logistics Agency and the foundations of President
Suharto, and as such was ￿rescued￿ by ￿persuading￿ one of the business conglomerates to contribute to
a bailout plan. The manager of the Treasury division was jailed and the management of the Bank changed.
3. Corporations: two corporations in cement (i.e. Indocement) and cold rolling mill which is the upstream
of steel production (i.e. CRMI) which had a large stake of the Salim group was ￿rescued￿ by the
government coming in as shareholders.
4. Cases of implicit government guarantees through providing captive market, special policy and directed
lending (often involving state banks and/or central bank liquidity credits). One of the most blatant
examples in recent times was the Timor National Car and the clove import monopoly, both linked to the
former President Suharto￿s youngest son. Timor was given special status of being allowed to import
their parts and components, and then later fully built up vehicles from Kia in Korea, duty free. The
argument was that satisfaction of local content would be met within three years. Not only was it given
this special duty free status, captive market was provided through government civil servants being given
special preferences to purchase the vehicle and for police cars to Timor. Furthermore banks, including
state banks, were asked to give loans to the venture. In the case of the clove monopoly, the private body
was given monopoly to purchase the cloves from farmers and resell to cigarette manufacturers, and was
provided low interest credit directly from the Central Bank. Later on it ran into many difficulties.7 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
banned commercial papers issuance by finance com-
panies2 which triggered a massive switch of their
source of funding from on-shore to off-shore bor-
rowings. In 1996 the Central Bank also required
commercial paper traded by banks to be rated, ef-
fectively requiring companies issuing commercial
paper to be rated.
Funds from offshore borrowing and capital in-
flows meant that domestic banks were flush with
liquidity, and since there was heavy reliance on the
banking sector3 for financing, there was rapid ex-
pansion of credit. This credit was directed at
increasingly unproductive and risky sectors such as
property and consumer lending to purchase and
speculate in property and stocks. Property lending
increased from 6 per cent of GDP in 1993, to 16 per
cent of GDP in 1996, and the amount of mortgage
loans almost tripled during the same period from Rp6
to Rp16 trillion. The resulting asset price increases
in the real estate and stock markets in turn progres-
sively skewed investments towards these sectors, as
banks increased lending, especially to the property
sector based on inflated collateral prices. The prop-
erty sector and other sectors such as infrastructure
and some manufacturing sectors (e.g. automotive)
experienced overinvestment and excess capacity.
Another important facet of the Indonesian bank-
ing system was the impact of increased financial
integration due to the opening up of the banking sec-
tor in 1988, with respect to efficiency of the banking
sector and risk appropriate behaviour of domestic
banks. The presence of foreign banks is intended to
facilitate transfer of technology in skill and prod-
ucts, through technical assistance or foreign bank
personnel moving to the local banks. However, it is
unclear that increased efficiency due to competition
was achieved based on two indicators, bank net in-
terest and operating margins, which did not show a
definitive declining trend. Part of the reason for this
outcome is that competition has increased the risk
profile and overhead costs of domestic banks by
crowding out of prime borrowers and the higher risk
and costs of competing domestically.
Foreign banks largely focused on the corporate
sector and within this segment have naturally focused
their attention on home-based or existing multina-
tional company customer base in Indonesia and the
top-tier corporations, given their more conservative
and strict credit risk profile, resulting in intense bank
competition within this market segment. Further-
more, top-tier corporations, also largely with the help
of foreign banks (investment and commercial banks)
have been active in tapping the capital markets (both
foreign and domestic) directly, either through the
issuance of equity or debt (short-term CP and long-
term bond) instruments. Stocks issued through the
capital markets grew from Rp27.6 trillion as of end-
1991 to Rp152.2 trillion by end-1995. For the same
period bonds issued grew from Rp2.2 trillion to
Rp5.3 trillion. The top-tier firms were obtaining
lower cost of offshore funding due to high domestic
interest, the risk premium charged were also declin-
ing due to learning as well as reputation. For instance
top-tier corporations such as Astra observed their
spread on Eurobonds narrowing from an average of
2.5￿3.0 per cent in the late 1980s down to around
1.5￿2.0 per cent in the 1990s.
Most of the domestic banks in Indonesia were
still in the still in the ￿risky￿ development phase
when the crisis hit. Domestic banks, trying to avoid
competing head-on with the foreign banks, gradu-
ally shifted their strategic business focus on what
they often called the middle market made up of sec-
ond-tier corporations, small and medium businesses
and individual consumers. Most of the top-tier pri-
vate banks began to focus on the retail middle market
as their major business in the mid-1990s. Given the
availability of information and the transparency of
issues, entry into this relatively new segment meant
that banks faced higher risk and inevitably experi-




(NPL/total property loans: per cent)
April
Sub-sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Construction 13.49 13.25 11.62 9.58 9.62
Real estate 8.05 5.77 4.48 3.71 4.37
Mortgage 3.20 2.67 2.72 2.99 3.67
Total property 9.24 7.86 6.53 5.69 6.04
Total credit n.a. 11.63 n.a. 8.79 9.23
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Reflecting this higher risk, interest spreads on re-
tail-type loans are normally 2 to 3 percentage points
higher than a corporate loan. Moreover, lending was
based mainly on collateral value, whether it is busi-
ness property, a house or a car. The collateral was
often specific to ensure quick repossession and even-
tually sales in the secondary market. Banks also
competed by geographical extension in the market
resulting in rapid expansion of branch networks with
increased overhead costs and venturing into new
locations and smaller towns, which raised further
the risk profile. Efforts to go public by a number of
the private banks also led to large investments in
technology and human resources, which kept net
interest margins high and operating margins low.
Despite their higher risk profile, most domes-
tic banks continued to have provision for bad debts
less than their non-performing levels. This practice
was not uncommon and was reinforced by Bank In-
donesia allowing banks to deduct loan collateral
value from the provisioning needs.
B. In sum: lessons learned from financial
liberalization
The important lesson here is that financial lib-
eralization should be done gradually and in a pace
that takes into account the preparedness of the un-
derlying institutions, legal and human capacity.
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) found
a strong relationship between financial liberaliza-
tion and financial fragility (53 developed and
developing countries during 1980￿1995 ￿ liberali-
zation observed policy change of deregulation of
interest rates) after controlling for other variables
such as macroeconomic variables, characteristics of
the banking sector, and institutional variables. He
found that stronger fragility occurs not immediately
after liberalization but a few years after; and lack of
institutions such as effective prudential regulation
and supervision, well functioning capital markets,
legal system. Bank franchise value falls after liber-
alization and there have been suggestions that
increased moral hazard is linked to this lower fran-
chise value and thus making banking crisis more
likely (Caprio and Summers, 1996 and Hellman et
al., 1994). That is, the benefits of financial liberali-
zation is offset by increased vulnerability to banking
crisis, if not sufficient attention is given to the insti-
tutional framework that will support a well function-
ing and open financial system. This suggests that
institutional development needs to be emphasized
early in the liberalization process and since this
requires time (training of supervisor and bank man-
agers, setting up institutions, etc.), a gradual path to
financial liberalization is recommended. Further-
more, more thought is needed when designing
appropriate prudential regulations and supervision
in developing countries.
Prior to the crisis in Indonesia, the argument re-
garding the optimal order of liberalization (McKinnon,
1982 and Edwards, 1984) was that, whilst conven-
tional wisdom could dictate a certain sequence of
liberalization, reality was that reforms were based
on more pragmatic considerations of ￿doability￿.
Financial sector liberalization in Indonesia faced less
resistance because more than half of the sector was
state owned. In comparison, there was more resist-
ance to real sector liberalization initially as the vested
interests were far greater. In the early 1990s, vari-
ous analyses of Indonesian reform noted the vulner-
abilities of reverse sequencing of Indonesian reforms
with respect to financial sector liberalization prior
to real sector liberalization, and with an open capi-
tal account as an initial starting point.4 Concerns were
raised with regard to institutional weaknesses and
the vulnerabilities from weak governance and lack
of transparency in the financial and corporate sec-
tor. However, high growth meant that these vulner-
abilities, whilst recognized, were not adequately
addressed.
The first lesson that emerged early on in the
crisis was that structural weaknesses precipitated the
crisis or at least made the crisis worse (i.e. lasting
longer and with deeper effect). Therefore, the way
to prevent future crisis was to correct the structural
weaknesses amounting to financial sector (pruden-
tial) bad governance and relationship banking. As
such the subsequent recommendations for reforms,
especially for the countries under an IMF pro-
gramme, were related to meeting the G-7 codes of
conduct, with some unrealistic expectations that they
would be met within a short span of time.
With hindsight, what should have Indonesia
done? What could other countries learn from Indo-
nesia? If a country already has an open capital ac-
count, then one has to be cautious about opening up
and managing the foreign exchange risks. There
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foreign exchange transactions can be conducted, and
certainly for an improved reporting practice. Insti-
tutions are key. If there is inability for supervision
and regulatory capacity, then a stepwise liberaliza-
tion needs to be considered. This could be a combi-
nation of real corporatization and eventual privati-
zation of state banks and allowing a limited number
of bona fide new entrants. Restructuring of the state
banks has been an unsuccessful story on its own and
this recommendation pre-dates the crisis.5
One old argument in Indonesia pre-crisis is that
rather than allow a limited number of new entrants,
whose granting of licenses will then be subjected to
rent seeking and intensive lobbying, it was better to
allow everyone to enter subject to certain criteria.
This argument is probably a good one for countries
where such selectivity would be a problem. The key
is of course to set the criteria sufficiently strict and
with the end goal in mind, desirability of new en-
trants in introducing fair competition, technology,
best practices and risk appropriate behaviour. The
criteria should be a combination of sufficiently high
capital, proven track record of the entrant (foreign
bank or fit and proper managers/directors).
Many of the recommendations for actions and
conditionalities in the IMF reform programmes
predicate on what was thought to be the causes of
the crisis and the structural vulnerabilities which led
to longer and deeper crisis. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to have a synthesis of the outcome of this debate
three years down the road, with more analysis and
hindsight behind us.
III. Lessons learned in systemic bank
crisis management and
restructuring
It is by now evident that mistakes were made
in the initial responses to the crisis by the Government
as well as the international financial institutions,
which made the systemic crisis worse and the even-
tual cost of managing the crisis higher than should
have been the case. What is the conventional wis-
dom on bank restructuring? What are the main
lessons that should be learned from these mistakes?
A. Conventional wisdom on bank
restructuring
Based on international experience and studies,
there are various options for undertaking bank re-
structuring. All the options entail tradeoffs between
speed of restructuring, fiscal costs, incentives for
bank performance and confidence in the banking
system (Claessens, 1998). At one extreme, bailouts
would be the fastest option, but these would entail
both the highest fiscal cost and the greatest disin-
centive for bank performance and financial disci-
pline, and also not increase the confidence of the
banking system. In the East Asian crisis, it is not
surprising that this option was not taken, and espe-
cially during the systemic banking crisis that faced
Indonesia. The other extreme would be to close down
unviable banks and pay off creditors and depositors.
This would also be speedy, send a strong signal about
financial discipline, and involve relatively low fis-
cal costs (depending on the extent of unviable insti-
tutions), but would have a dire effect on the confi-
dence of the banking system. The outcome was that
most East Asian governments chose the intermedi-
ate path for restructuring, of selective closures of
the most unviable banks, combined with one of the
other options of facilitating mergers of banks or
recapitalize distressed banks with the option to sell
the banks at a later date. These options were thought
to involve lower fiscal costs; moderate to better in-
centives for better bank performance; and potential
for restoring the confidence in the banking system.
The experience of other bank crises, including
the lessons learned thus far in East Asian bank re-
structuring (Claessens et al., 1999) suggests that there
are some key principles that should be adhered to
correct the banking system in response to the crisis
and restructuring the banking system. First, only vi-
able institutions should remain in operation; costs
of restructuring should be allocated in a transparent
manner, while minimizing costs to tax payers; and
restructuring should be done in a way that strength-
ens good financial sector governance by allocating
losses to existing shareholders, creditors and perhaps
large depositors. Second, the measures introduced
and implementation thereof should also ensure that
the incentives for new private capital are preserved
and that there is discipline toward bank borrowers.10 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
Finally restructuring needs to occur at a sufficient
pace to restore credit while maintaining confidence
in the banking system.
Based on past experience there are also recom-
mendations with regard to the sequencing of bank
restructuring (box 2).
How did the responses actually undertaken
compare with conventional wisdom and what can
be learned from these lessons? In applying the
conventional wisdom to managing the crisis in In-
donesia, what were the lessons learned and could
the mistakes have been avoided?
B. Initial responses to the bank crisis
Prior to the entry of the IMF, the initial re-
sponses by the Indonesian authorities were actually
very similar to the conventional wisdom of IMF pro-
grammes: raise interest rates, fiscal austerity, freeing
up the exchange rate and addressing the weaknesses
in the banking sector. However, the lack of credibil-
ity of the programme and the inconsistent approach
to interest rate increases led to loss of confidence.
The Indonesian authorities responded to the
float of the Thai baht in July 1997 by initially wid-
ening the exchange rate band with the first wave of
capital outflow from international mutual and hedge
funds, and finally floated the rupiah in mid-August
(box 3). Monetary policy was tightened consider-
ably, with overnight call rates increasing to 81 per
cent and Bank Indonesia Certificate (Sertifikat Bank
Indonesia, SBI) rates doubling from 12 to 30 per cent.
However, the rupiah continued to weaken and de-
preciated even further as corporations with large and
unhedged external debt tried to cover their positions.
The combination of rupiah depreciation, high inter-
est rates and problems experienced by over-leveraged
borrowers led to the first round of effects on the bank-
ing system and Bank Indonesia had already begun
to provide liquidity support to some banks.
In early September 1997 the Government, to
respond to the crisis announced a number of steps
Box 2
SEQUENCING OF BANK RESTRUCTURING
1. Responding to acute crisis: to stop panic and bank runs
￿ Crisis: over leveraging, denial of government and bank owners;
￿ Bank runs intensify, confidence falters: central bank provides liquidity credit with the intention of
sterilizing the liquidity support so as not to loose monetary control;
￿ If liquidity credit fails to stem runs: introduce deposit or blanket guarantee scheme.
2. Stabilizing and restructuring the banking system
￿ Consolidate, recognize losses, take over, close down, merger;
￿ Recapitalize viable banks;
￿ Introduce new rules and regulations.
3. Recovery to normal banking system
￿ Nationalized banks are privatized, corporate debt restructured, bad assets sold;
￿ Phase out blanket guarantee and replace with normal deposit insurance scheme.
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such as fiscal austerity, postponing private power
projects related to President Suharto￿s children, and
a plan to restructure the banking sector which would
include closures of unsound banks. However, the
programme was ambiguous and lacked specificity
and more importantly the perception was that the
programme would not be implemented seriously. The
Government, under pressure from the business sec-
tor, also undertook measures to loosen monetary
stance and reduce interest rates, which sent conflict-
ing signals about monetary policy and led to further
capital outflow. Finally, amidst worsening confi-
dence and weakening rupiah, the Government
announced that Indonesia would ask the IMF for
assistance.
In a departure from past crises where techno-
cratic ministers were able to convince and were
supported by the leadership to undertake necessary
steps and utilized crises to push needed reforms, In-
donesia requested for assistance from the IMF. On
1 November 1997, the Government of Indonesia
signed the first IMF letter of intent (LOI). The initial
IMF package has been criticized for several reasons,
some of which the IMF itself has now acknowledged.
The first reason is the broadness of the package it-
self. The ￿conditionalities￿ included the usual IMF
menu of macroeconomic stabilization measures6 but
also included issues on the environment and the in-
clusion of structural measures including in banking
sector. Second there were also some severe dead-
Box 3
CHRONOLOGY JULY TO OCTOBER 1997
2 July: Thai baht floated.
11 July: Peso floated; widen band on Rupiah float.
14 August: Rupiah floated. Finance Minister ordered Rp3.4 trillion deposits (10 per cent base
money) of state enterprise deposits to be transferred to Central Bank Certificates.  Short-
term interest rates rose and SBI doubled; announced plans to merge state banks and
reshuffled senior management of state banks.
20 August: Banks beginning to feel stress, shortage of liquidity and high interest rates, corporations
scrambled to cover foreign exchange exposures.
3 September: Announce broad government stabilization plan: ease bank liquidity and interest rates,
budget revisions (especially cancellation of mega projects) to counter decline in
revenues, deregulation in real sector, closure of insolvent banks and 49 per cent limit
of foreign purchases on IPO lifted. Lack of specifics, timelines or concrete follow up
in the following weeks. Monetary policy eased too quickly, 20 per cent early September
to 16 per cent by mid-October.
16 September: Review and postponement of private and public mega projects, postponement, short of
cancellation.
18 September: Go-ahead for 15 well connected projects even though they figured in postponed or
review list, as long as had sufficient funding. Undermine credibility and missed
opportunity to send signal of commitment to macro stabilization and reforms on own
initiative, instead of negotiating with IMF.
8 October: Continued weakening of rupiah, BI had to intervene continuously, and market scepticism
of seriousness of President Suharto/Government to undertake reforms. Finally
Government turned to IMF assistance.
31 October: First IMF stabilization package: strong macroeconomic programme, structural reforms
especially strengthening financial sector. Amount of assistance large and various
mistakes in implementation.12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
lines imposed on meeting these conditionalities. It
was unrealistic to expect that these conditionalities
would be met by the Government of Indonesia within
the short time given (three years), because the re-
forms involved major changes in the law, setting up
new institutions or changing existing institutions
radically, and the way policy and regulations were
to be implemented. In particular the push on struc-
tural reforms that were to be taken as the ￿signal￿ of
President Suharto￿s commitment to reforms, such as
those affecting his children￿s businesses, represented
a serious miscalculation on the part of the techno-
crats and the IMF. The outcome was a resistance from
the President and reversals of the announced reforms
that led to a worsening crisis of confidence. The tech-
nocrats and the IMF miscalculated the way the
package of reforms worked on ￿confidence￿.
The IMF position was that structural reforms,
especially in the financial and corporate sectors, were
crucial to stabilization. It is not clear whether the
technocrats were supporting this approach, or re-
sponded to IMF pressure. Based on experience, it
seems probable that the technocrats were using the
crisis, now with external pressure, to get President
Suharto to undertake reforms in areas to which he
was resistant (particularly where it concerns the eco-
nomic activities of his children). In the past, the
argument was also that such measures were needed
to indicate the seriousness of the President￿s political
will to undertake reforms and thus build confidence.
However, this time, a serious miscalculation had been
made and the push was made too far and too wide,
including using external pressure that was unlike the
previous occasions.
Focusing in more detail on the bank restructur-
ing component of the reform package, the initial
responses were partly in accordance with the ￿con-
ventional wisdom￿ of what was still being perceived
as a limited banking crisis, and quite comprehen-
sive; i.e. the immediate closure of 16 small and
deeply insolvent banks (market share: 2.5 per cent),
and the introduction of a guarantee scheme to en-
sure continued confidence in the banking system.
The protection scheme was limited to small deposi-
tors of up to Rp20 million (around US$ 6,000), which
accounted for 90 per cent of the number of depositors
in the banking system. In addition, the package in-
cluded intensifying the supervision of 34 of the
largest private banks; rehabilitation and surveillance
plans for a number of smaller private banks; and re-
forms of the state banks in accordance with World
Bank recommendations (i.e. rationalization, mergers,
privatization and recovery of bad debts) (Kenward,
1999).
The strategy of a comprehensive package of
structural reforms and a large amount of assistance
amounting to $10.1 billion (4 times Indonesia￿s
quota), shored up in the first few days with inter-
vention to the tune of $4 billion by a concerted action
of central banks to strengthen the rupiah, was in-
tended to restore confidence. Indeed the rupiah
strengthened by around 10 per cent. However, this
was short-lived and after two weeks began to falter
because the closures of the banks were not well
planned and executed. First, despite the fact that bank
closures were widely expected prior to the first IMF
LOI, the fact that the banks that were closed did not
include the ones already weak or inactive such as
Bappindo, Bank Pacific and some others, raised the
question of the arbitrariness of the criteria. The cri-
teria and the main contents of the first IMF LOI was
never made clear or publicly available (as was the
case with subsequent IMF LOI). Lack of clarity with
regard to the criteria led to speculation that more
banks would be closed ￿ especially since the names
of the other 34 banks that were to be rehabilitated
were not made known. The lack of transparency and
arbitrariness was worsened when the son of the Presi-
dent, owner of one of the closed banks, challenged
the Minister of Finance regarding the closure of his
bank. The outcome was that the bank remained
closed, but was resurrected by subsuming it under
the license of another bank. This was the first indi-
cation that the President was not going to adhere to
the IMF reforms, and this perception had a serious
effect on confidence.
Second, the deposit guarantee of Rp20 million
did not provide the comfort level needed and do-
mestic investors began to withdraw their deposits
from private banks and transfer them to state banks
(i.e. a flight to ￿safety￿ rather than quality) or for-
eign banks, or repatriated the funds abroad. This
marked the onset of domestic capital outflows, which
worsened rapidly in December 1997 as the crisis of
confidence deepened. At this time the crisis of con-
fidence deepened due to rumours of further bank
closures, about the illness of the President and the
death of Sudono Salim ￿ the captain of the largest
business conglomerate and owner of the largest bank,
Bank Central Asia, and the firing of the Central Bank
governor. By mid-December, 154 banks (half of the
total assets of the banking system) had faced a run13 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
on their deposits and throughout this month Bank
Indonesia￿s liquidity support to banks increased from
Rp13 trillion to Rp31 trillion, or 5 per cent of GDP.
In effect the liquidity support was funnelled abroad
(Lindgren et al., 1999). Announcements of restruc-
turing of the state banks with the merger of four of
the state banks (Bappindo, BBD, BDN and Bexim)
into one, and allowing one to become the subsidiary
of another (BTN and BNI 1946), did little to restore
confidence.
A third shortcoming was the lack of prioriti-
zation of the corporate debt problem, mainly because
initially the magnitude of private external debt was
not precisely known since Indonesia had an open
capital account and had never enforced or monitored
reporting requirements. A special task force was set
up to assist private sector debtors to negotiate with
creditors, but the impact of corporate distress due to
the macroeconomic shocks and subsequently the
effect it had on the banking sector, was not well un-
derstood by the IMF or the government economic
policy makers. The macro shocks led to corporate
distress and a rise in non-performing loans, and the
fact that corporates had external short-term liabilities
that were much higher than envisaged, and the need
to roll over these liabilities became a major issue.
C. Dynamics of crisis: second round of
stabilization
The crisis of confidence worsened in January
1998. With the announcement of an unrealistic
budget, it became clear that the President was not
committed to reforms. Decision making was under-
taken without consulting with the technocrats, and
the governor and four directors of the Central Bank
were dismissed. The rupiah plummeted to Rp15,000
towards the end of January as bank runs and capital
outflow continued. The crisis of confidence sealed
the fate of the banking sector into a full-fledged sys-
temic crisis and liquidity support from Bank
Indonesia exceeded Rp60 trillion by end of January.
By end-January, a number of steps were taken to
restore confidence in the banking system.
1. Initial steps to restore confidence
The first step was to establish the Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). It was the cre-
ated as a centralized agency to assist the Govern-
ment in its banking sector restructuring and re-
capitalization programme and was given a finite life
of five years (Indonesia, 1998). At the same time the
Government announced the provision of a deposit
guarantee for all deposits to prevent further bank
runs. IBRA has three main activities: (1) To imple-
ment the government guarantee programme, includ-
ing the registration of bank￿s liability, premium pay-
ments, and the administering of claim verifications.
The government guarantee on all bank liabilities
covered both on- and off-balance sheet obligations,
with subsequent automatic extensions every six
months, unless an announcement is made by IBRA.7
(2) To restructure banks through closures, mergers,
recapitalizations and eventually the sale of govern-
ment ownership in these troubled banks; to recover
the transferred bad loans; and to monitor and sell
corporate assets pledged or transferred to IBRA from
former bank owners as collateral for emergency BI
liquidity credits (table 3). (3) The coordination and
supervision of banks that had been frozen or closed,
in order to complete the whole process of closing
banks.
These activities included the execution of op-
erational activities as well as management and
administration of settlement processes. Under the
law8, IBRA has been granted extraordinary powers,
including certain judicial powers to execute agree-
ments in its name, to acquire, manage, transfer and
sell banks assets, and to restructure and to rehabili-
tate the banks under its supervision.
The immediate impact on confidence-building
was relatively positive and by early February
the value of the rupiah strengthened to around
Rp10,000￿Rp12,000. By this time 54 banks (36.4 per
cent of banking sector) that had borrowed heavily
from BI (more than 200 per cent of their capital and
CAR less than 5 per cent) were placed under IBRA
supervision. The banks included four state-owned
banks (BAPINDO, Bank Bumi Daya, BDNI and
Bank Exim) which accounted for one-quarter of the
liabilities of the banking sector. However, the con-
tinued uncertainties regarding the implementation
of the IMF reforms, including the President￿s appar-
ent insistence to introduce the currency board system
during February, the replacement of the head of
IBRA and the political uncertainties leading up to
the Presidential selection in March of that year fur-
ther undermined confidence: deposit runs persisted;
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and, liquidity support continued to increase. The
Central Bank shifted from a strategy of using high
interest rates to deter irresponsible usage of liquid-
ity support, to non-market sanctions. Banks with
borrowings outstanding for more than one week
would be inspected by the Central Bank, which in
turn had one week to report whether the banks ac-
tivities should be restricted or whether the bank
should be put under IBRA.
In early April, IBRA announced its first major
action whereby seven of the banks (15.6 per cent of
liabilities) which has borrowed more than Rp2 tril-
lion each and accounted for over 72 per cent of total
Bank Indonesia liquidity support were taken over
(banks taken over (BTO)). The owners of these banks
were suspended and the management was changed.
Out of the seven, one was a state bank, the Bank
EXIM and the other six comprised the major private
banks. Seven other smaller banks (0.4 per cent of
banking system) that had borrowed more than 500 per
cent of their capital were closed. Learning from the
previous experience of bank closures, great effort
was made to assure smooth transition by ensuring
that the deposits of these closed banks were directly
transferred to a designated state bank, Bank Negara
Indonesia on that weekend itself, and by announc-
ing and explaining the objective criteria for closure
and BTO. As a result the actions were well received
by the market and only sporadic runs occurred.
In the weeks leading up to the May 1998 riots
and the resignation of President Suharto the bank-
ing system was, unfortunately, hit by another big
shock. The rupiah, which had stabilized at around
Rp10,000 in the February￿April period, destabilized
again to go above Rp10,000. There ensued serious
loss of confidence by both domestic and foreign in-
vestors. After these events, there were massive
deposit runs on the biggest bank, Bank Central Asia
(BCA), which accounted for 12 per cent of the bank-
ing system. The majority owner of BCA is the Salim
group which is known to be close to President
Suharto. In fact, two children of the President hold
30 per cent of the shares of BCA. The Central Bank
and two state banks injected liquidity support of
Rp30 trillion to BCA over the week following
16 May. On 29 May, BCA was taken over by IBRA,
Table 3
CHRONOLOGY OF BANK CLOSURES
01/11/97 14/02/98 04/04/98 29/05/98 21/08/98 30/09/98 13/05/99
Private domestic banks
Liquidated 16(2.5) . . ....
Surveillance (IBRA) . 50(11) 37 ....
BTO (IBRA) . . 6 7 4 . 11
Frozen . . 7 . 10 . .
Closed . . . . . . 38
M e r g e d . . 4....
Recapitalization . . . . . . 9
State banks
Surveillance . 4(25) 3 ....
B T O . . 1....
Merged . . . . . 4 .
Regional banks . . .....
JV and foreign . . .....
Note: 04/04/98: Six private BTO banks ￿ BUN, BDNI, Modern, Danamon, Tiara Asia, PDFCI and one BTO state bank, EXIM.
Seven frozen ￿ Surya, Pelita, Subentra, Hokindo, Istismarat, Deka and Centris.
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the shareholder￿s rights were suspended and man-
agement was changed. This stemmed the runs on
BCA.
After the crisis of confidence in May 1998, in-
terest rates began to rise steeply, with SBI reaching
70 per cent per annum and in banks interest rate and
deposit rates also reached a 60￿70 per cent level.
Inflation also rose to almost 80 per cent. The nega-
tive spread experienced by the banking sector
increased substantially during this period, further
affecting its capital base. In October 1998, the eq-
uity of the private national and the seven state banks
dropped to the negative zone, leaving a major por-
tion of the banking sector technically insolvent. The
economy contracted at close to 14 per cent in 1998
and bank NPL reached 75 per cent of total loans.
2. Rehabilitation and recapitalization of the
banking system
After the resignation of President Suharto in
May 1998, and with the Government under the lead-
ership of the former Vice-President Habibie, there
followed a few months of uncertainty with the ex-
change rate remaining weak and interest rates high.
Little progress was made by way of bank restructur-
ing, although much was done in terms of auditing
all the banks in the banking system. It was clear that
the next step of bank restructuring would involve
further closures of non-viable banks and, rehabilita-
tion and recapitalizing the remaining viable banks.
Learning from their mistakes, the audits were nec-
essary in order to have clear criteria of viability.
Rehabilitation and recapitalization also needed to be
linked to operational restructuring in terms of im-
posing a cost to the existing owners (dilution of
shareholding, forced consolidation, change in own-
ership/management) and ensuring subsequent pru-
dential oversight subsequently.
In a systemic bank crisis as Indonesia faced, it
was clear that private capital was unlikely to be at-
tracted without government participation. With the
blanket guarantee, the cost of recapitalization be-
came the burden of the Government. The cost of the
restructuring was in turn intricately linked to the
ability to resolve value-impaired assets by restruc-
turing non-performing loans (restructuring, resched-
uling, sale and swap) and sale of assets and banks
taken over. The Government of Indonesia had opted
for a centralized structure to resolve the sale and
restructuring of assets, and this in turn led to much
political interference.
The audits revealed the complexity and mag-
nitude of the Indonesian banking crisis. In June 1998
the result of the audits of the six private banks, which
were first taken over in April 1998 revealed that (i)
the average non-performing loans (NPL) reached an
average of 55 per cent of loans (90 per cent in one
large bank); (ii) loans were dominated by affiliated
lending; and (iii) banks were deeply insolvent. On
21 August, three of these banks ￿ Bank Umum
Nasional, BDNI and Bank Modern ￿were declared
frozen and their deposits transferred to designated
state banks. The rehabilitation programme for the
other three private banks were that (i) Bank Danamon
was to be recapitalized by the Government and to
act as a bridge bank for further mergers with other
banks; and (ii) PDFCI and Bank Tiara were given a
final opportunity to be recapitalized by their owners
or be closed or merged with Bank Danamon. In early
August the results of the other banks also revealed
the weak situation of these banks and the underly-
ing deep problems of the banking system.
The criteria for viability was based on banks￿
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) with the following
categorization: category A (CAR above 4 per cent),
B (CAR between 4 per cent to negative 25 per cent)
or C (CAR below negative 25 per cent). Category C
Banks that failed to increase their CAR to 4 per cent
within 30 days would be frozen. Category B Banks
were then subjected to further classification, to the
possibility of closure (BBKU, Bank Beku Kegiatan
Usaha, or BBO, Bank Beku Operasi), recapitali-
zation or being taken over by the Government (BTO).
IBRA moved to act against 10 of the former
bank owners of the BTOs which were deemed to
have violated their legal requirements. In essence
they were asked to pay back the liquidity support
obtained from Bank Indonesia and the amount of
affiliated lending. By late September some Rp200 tril-
lion of assets at the owners valuation had been
pledged from several of these owners as well as about
Rp1 trillion in cash. IBRA￿s advisors valued the as-
sets at Rp92.8 trillion and tentative settlement. A
protracted debate ensued as to how much cash up
front owners should provide and there was political
controversy as suggestions of restructuring of asset
ownership emerged, including the possibility of giv-
ing some shares to cooperatives. At the end it was
agreed that the obligations should be settled within16 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
four years and that 27 per cent be realized in the
first year. This debate continues to date, as some
owners have only provided very little cash and asset
value is, for one reason or another, now far below
than when it was first assessed (e.g. collapse in pulp
prices, worsening macroeconomic conditions, etc.).
Some questions are also now being raised with re-
gard to the ￿fairness￿ of the agreements signed be-
tween the former owners and the Government.
Chart 1 shows the bank recapitalization scheme
in Indonesia. It shows that the Government basically
issues bonds to commercial banks as part of the
recapitalization programme, and to Bank Indonesia
as part of the repayment programme since Bank In-
donesia has provided the liquidity support to the
banking system. As already noted, the burden of
recapitalization of banks was borne fully by the
Government since, given the situation, one could not
hope for private investors to inject capital.
(a) Private banks
IBRA moved to launch its recapitalization pro-
gramme in September 1998. The objective was to
recapitalize viable banks and to establish burden
sharing between the Government in the form of
bonds, and owners in the form of cash. The owners
had the first option to reacquire their bank shares by
repaying the government contribution after three
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To encourage owners to inject new capital, the Gov-
ernment allowed them to retain control over the
management of the banks, although they were re-
quired to present a viable business plan. Category 5
loans, or those classified as loss were to be also trans-
ferred at zero-price to the Asset Management Unit
of IBRA. Any resale of these loans would be used to
buy back the government preference shares, thus
giving Government the possibility to earn return on
its capital injection and reduce the amount which
owners need to pay to reacquire the bank.
Category A banks (i.e. CAR above 4 per cent)
were deemed viable and could resume its operations.
Category B banks (i.e. CAR between 4 per cent and
negative 25 per cent) were declared eligible for the
recapitalization programme under the condition that
their respective bank owners inject 20 per cent of
the total new capital required to increase CAR to 4 per
cent. Bank owners of category C banks (i.e. CAR
below negative 25 per cent) were given time to boost
their respective bank￿s equity position. Those banks,
whose owners failed to inject additional capital re-
quirements, would be closed. For those in category
B, but whose owners couldn￿t meet the additional
capital requirements there was still a chance of be-
ing taken over by IBRA (BTO) provided that the bank
had sufficient depositor base and branch coverage.
Despite the clear criteria, the implementation
of the recapitalization programme experienced vari-
ous delays due to political uncertainties and intense
lobbying by owner of banks that were in danger of
being closed down for not having complied with
CAR. In the end, after a one-month delay and politi-
cal compromises, some banks which should have
been closed ended up being taken over by the Gov-
ernment. These glitches further affected confidence
and the rupiah weakened again to Rp10,000. In mid-
March 1999 the Government announced that there
were 73 category ￿A￿ banks out of the 140 banks
which did not need government support; nine banks
making up 10 per cent of the banking system were
categorized as B and eligible for the recapitalization
programme; 38 banks (5 per cent banking sector)
were closed; and seven banks (2 per cent of banking
system) were taken over by IBRA. The owners and
managers of the ￿A￿ banks also had to be reviewed
by the fit and proper test, and one third did not pass
the test. The managers and commissioners who did
not pass the test had to be replaced, and owners who
did not pass the test were given 90 days to divest
their shares.
Of the nine category B banks were given five
weeks to inject additional capital, seven met the
20 April deadline. Among these were the three larger
banks ￿Bank Internasional Indonesia (Sinar Mas
Group), Lippo (Lippo Group) and Universal (Astra
Group), and the four smaller-sized banks ￿ Bukopin
(Cooperative Bank), Prima Ekspress, Arta Media and
Patriot. Two others ￿ Bank Bali and Bank Niaga
experienced problems. Bank Bali was in the midst
of negotiations with Standard Chartered to take over
their shares when the corruption scandal broke. In
the end IBRA, had to take over Bank Bali. In the
case of Bank Niaga, the major shareholder did not
come through and in the end was also taken over by
IBRA. Among the 13 banks taken over by IBRA,
nine were merged with Danamon, while the BCA,
Bank Bali and Bank Niaga were recapitalized.
IBRA negotiated performance contracts and
MOUs with the owners and management of the eight
banks to be recapitalized by taking ordinary stocks
and allowing management control to the owners of
the banks. The estimated amount needed for
recapitalization had been set in September 1998.
Since then, however, the economic and political situ-
ation in fact did not much improve and by May, in
the period leading up to the elections, the economy
had not recovered and the rupiah remained weak.
Thus, by May 1999, the updated audits indicated that
the amounts needed for recapitalization would be
almost double than what was originally predicted.
(b) State banks
The progress on restructuring state banks has
been much slower. As already noted one bank (Bank
Exim) was taken over by IBRA and another four were
merged. The corporate business segment of Bank
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) was also moved into the
newly merged bank, Bank Mandiri, and BRI was to
concentrate on small businesses. The non-perform-
ing loans of the four merged banks were transferred
to the Asset Management Unit of IBRA. Although
the consolidation of the state banks has been termed
as a merger, it more aptly resembles the closure of
4 banks and consolidating the remaining perform-
ing assets in one single bank (Bank Mandiri). The
management of Bank Mandiri was entrusted to pro-
fessionals with technical assistance from Deutsche
Bank, and steps were taken to consolidate the bank
and change the management style. Half of the staff
has been retrenched and branches have been closed.18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
Other than Bank Mandiri, there are now three re-
maining state banks (BNI, BTN and BRI) that have
also submitted their restructuring plans.
Whereas all five of the state banks (including
the newly established Bank Ekspor Indonesia),
slightly less than half of the 27 Regional Develop-
ment Banks (RDBs) fell under category C. However,
due to the perceived importance and political sensi-
tivity of the issue, the Government opted to maintain
the state banks and RDBs. All state banks and RDBs
were capitalized (box 4 and table 4).
Box 4
Table 4
SUMMARY OF BANK INDUSTRY HIGHLIGHTS, END-1999
Regional
State bank Private bank development bank Foreign/JV bank
31 December: 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Number of banks 7 5 144 92 27 27 44 41
Branches/bk 218 316 29 39 20 20 2 2
Assets (IDR tn) 201.9 417.3 248.7 291.6 12.3 18.8 75.2 102.4
Loans (IDR tn) 153.3 112.3 168.7 56.0 7.5 6.8 48.6 50.0
Deposits (IDR tn) 133.0 312.2 177.2 252.9 8.8 14.0 38.6 72.3
Capital (IDR tn) 13.8 (17.7) 25.2 (10.2) 1.3 2.0 6.1 4.3
Source: Bank Indonesia.
SUMMARY OF BANK RESTRUCTURING AS OF 1999
No. of banks before Bank category No. of banks after
 restructuring A B C Restructuring process restructuring
State banks 7 - - 7 4 merged into 1 5
1 new bank (export)
All recapitalized
RDBs 27 13 10 4 12 recapilatized 27
Private national banks 142 72 40 30 48 closed 92
7 recapitalized
13 BTO
Source: Kompas (Indonesian daily newspaper), and estimates.19 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
D. The cost of bank restructuring
1. The size of domestic debt
Table 5 presents the composition and size of
domestic public debt, which can be classified into
two categories: the recapitalization bonds for the
commercial banks and the repayment bonds to Bank
Indonesia. The amount of outstanding debt increased
rapidly, along with the programme of bank restruc-
turing and recapitalization from 1998 to 2000. The
total government bond in December 2001 was more
than Rp700 trillion, or about 50 per cent of GDP.
The total amount of bond to recapitalize the bank-
ing sector was Rp435 trillion, or about 43 per cent
of the total asset in all commercial banks in the coun-
try in the end of 2001. The size of government bond
in the balance sheet of the banking system was cer-
tainly much larger than the total amount of
outstanding credit of about Rp300 trillion. As dis-
cussed above, the increasing amount of government
bonds reflects the problems of banking restructur-
ing and the crisis of confidence which were caused
by the initial closure of the 16 banks, insufficient
deposit guarantee initially, delays and political in-
terference in bank restructuring and compounded by
the political crises.
There are three types of bank recapitalization
bonds: (1) The variable rate bonds which are trade-
able; (2) the fixed rate bonds (also tradeable); and
(3) the hedge bonds which are non-tradeable and at
maturity will be paid with other bonds.
The variable rate bond is based on flexible
interest rates which is calculated based on the fluc-
tuation of the three months SBI (Bank Indonesia
Certificate) rates. The interest on these bonds is paid
every three months, and the interest rates of these
bonds are around 13 to 15 per cent at present and
mature between 3 to 15 years to mature, with the
first maturity already falling due in July 2002.
The fixed bonds have a fixed interest rate, vary-
ing from 12 per cent to 14 per cent per annum, and
the interest is paid every six months. Due to interest
rate increases experienced in 2001, the interest rate
was increased to more than 17 per cent, and the
Government conducted bond-exchange offers to in-
Table 5
PUBLIC DOMESTIC DEBT
(Cumulative, in trillion rupiah)
Recapitalization bond Repayments bonds
for recapitalized banks for Bank Indonesia Total bonds
Variable Fixed In As
rate rate Hedge Sub- Bank Sub- trillion per cent
Period bonds bonds bonds total BLBIa guarantee KLBIb total rupiah of GDP
December 1998 ---- 100.0 - - 100.0 100.0 10.5
March 1999 ---- 164.5 - - 164.5 164.5 15.0
June 1999 95.1 8.7 - 103.8 164.5 53.8 - 218.3 322.1 29.3
December 1999 203.9 51.3 26.6 281.8 164.5 53.8 9.97 228.3 510.1 46.4
December 2000 217.0 175.0 35.0 427.0 164.5 53.8 9.97 228.3 655.3 51.1
December 2001 219.5 175.5 40.4 435.3 164.5 93.8 9.97 268.3 703.6 47.2
June 2002 245.2 154.2 30.4 429.8 164.5 93.8 9.97 268.3 698.0 41.4
Source: Table 1.4 in Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu (2002).
a Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support.
b Bank Indonesia Credit Program.20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
crease the interest rate of the bond and make it more
attractive, even though the weighted average of the
coupon rates remains the same. These bonds now
carry 10 per cent to 16.5 per cent coupon rates. These
bonds have 5 to 10 years to mature, and the first
maturity date would be in September 2004.
The hedge bond is hedged to an exchange rate
(Rp/US$) and is used to cover the exchange rate risk
by the bank due to foreign liabilities. Every three
months, the interest rate is paid and the nominal value
of the hedge bond is re-evaluated based on exchange
rate fluctuation. If the rupiah depreciates, the nomi-
nal value of the hedge bonds will of course increase.
The interest rate is SIBOR plus 3 per cent.
The total amount of repayment bonds to Bank
Indonesia amounted to about Rp268 trillion in De-
cember 2001. These bonds consist mainly of the
repayment bonds to cover the BLBI (Liquidity Sup-
port Bank Indonesia) channelled by Bank Indonesia
from 1997￿1998 (Rp164.5 trillion) and the bank
guarantee provided by Bank Indonesia as part of the
bank restructuring programme (Rp93.8). There are
many controversies surrounding the issuance of
BLBI bonds regarding the size of the liquidity sup-
port that could be much larger than the asset of the
troubled bank itself; and that the assets pledged by
the bank owners and shareholders in return to the
support given by Bank Indonesia being significantly
less than the amount of liquidity support received
by these banks. In fact, the government audit agency
found many irregularities in the process of channel-
ling the liquidity by Bank Indonesia.
2. Fiscal consequences
Massive public debt creates serious budgetary
constraints for the Government and reduces the flex-
ibility of fiscal policies (table 6). Before the crisis,
total debt service payment for the principal and in-
terest of external debt, accounted for 26 per cent of
domestic revenue. In 2002, the Government has
budgeted about 45 per cent of the revenue for debt
service payment, while the interest payment on the
domestic bond alone accounted for more than 21 per
cent of domestic revenue in 2001 and 2002. Exter-
nal debt service payment has been kept relatively
low because of Paris Club debt rescheduling in 1998,
2000, and 2002. External debt service decreased from
more than 37 per cent of domestic revenue in 1998/
1999 to 13 per cent in 2000 before went up to 24 per
cent in 2004.
Because of large debt obligation, the Govern-
ment has been forced to reduce expenditures on
development and subsidies. In 2002, about 40 per
cent of total government expenditure is already com-
mitted for debt service payment and about 27 per
cent will be transferred to the regional government,
with the central government spending becoming re-
sidual in the budget.
3. The real cost of banking bailout
Government bonds were issued to banks in
return for the assets that were transferred to the Gov-
ernment. These assets are owned by IBRA, and the
net cost of bank restructuring would amount to the
difference between the amounts of the bonds issued
and the face value of the assets. The balance sheet
of IBRA, calculated based on data in December 2001
is presented in table 7. The estimated value of total
assets transferred to IBRA is Rp548 trillion, which
consists of Rp275 trillion from the Asset Manage-
ment Credit (AMC), Rp141 trillion from Asset Man-
agement Investment (AMI), and Rp132 trillion from
the Bank Restructuring Unit (BRU).9 The total li-
ability, in the form of bonds issued to Bank Indone-
sia and to recapitalized banks, amounted to Rp703
trillion by the end of 2001. The difference between
asset and liability at their book values consists of
IBRA￿s implicit equity in state banks and the differ-
ence between the collections of shareholder settle-
ments and the repayment bonds issued to Bank In-
donesia. The revenue from asset disposal will auto-
matically finance the cost of banking restructuring
as the revenue would go to the asset side of bank￿s
balance sheet and then reduce the amount of gov-
ernment recapitalization bond.
Based on the estimated market value, IBRA is
expected to recover about Rp208 trillion from its
total asset, or about 38 per cent recovery rate. The
difference between IBRA￿s asset and liability at their
market values represents the estimated net cost of
banking restructuring in Indonesia. This out of pocket
expenses that the taxpayer has to pay would be
around Rp495 trillion at best, or more than 33 per
cent of the GDP in 2001. But based on the actual
asset recovery, the real cost is expected to be more
than that. IBRA will be closed by the end of 2003,21 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
and the amount of asset recovery by IBRA is esti-
mated at about Rp111 trillion, which is about half of
the targeted recovery rate. Most of the asset man-
aged by the Asset Management Credit of Rp275 tril-
lion has been put up for sale, and the cash proceeds
reached Rp75 trillion so far, which is still lower than
the targeted recovery of Rp96 trillion. In other words,
it is doubtful that IBRA could meet the Rp208 tril-
lion cumulative cash recovery target overtime, and
therefore the net present value of the banking re-
structuring is expected to be higher. The issue is how
to finance this burden overtime, so that the country
could override its domestic debt without the fear of
monetary or fiscal deficit explosions in the future.
The Government has not been very open about
the massive loss that resulted from its bank restruc-
turing programme. The issue is very complex,
controversial, and politically sensitive. One cause
for the low recovery is the delay in asset collections
and disposal, due to ongoing disputes, lack of coop-
eration, and defaults in almost all shareholders
settlements, which could not be prosecuted under
weak legal system. Another is the lack of political
Table 6
GOVERNMENT DEBT SERVICE PAYMENT IN GOVERNMENT BUDGET
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000 2001 2002
In trillion rupiah
Total: domestic + external 22.9 29.5 62.9 63.1 57.7 115.3 136.4
External 22.9 29.5 54.5 40.9 26.5 49.0 72.9
Principal 13.0 12.8 30.3 20.8 7.6 19.7 44.0
Interest 9.9 16.7 24.2 20.1 18.8 29.3 29.0
Domestic 0.0 0.0 8.4 22.2 31.2 66.3 63.4
Bond 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9
Interest 0.0 0.0 8.4 22.2 31.2 66.3 59.5
As per cent of revenue
Total debt service 26.1 26.3 42.8 30.9 28.1 38.4 45.2
External debt service 26.1 26.3 37.1 20.0 12.9 16.3 24.2
Domestic debt service 0.0 0.0 5.7 10.9 15.2 22.1 21.0
As per cent of expenditure
Total debt service 29.4 26.4 37.4 27.3 26.6 32.5 39.6
External debt service 29.4 26.4 32.4 17.7 12.2 13.8 21.2
Domestic debt service 0.0 0.0 5.0 9.6 14.4 18.7 18.4
Development expenditure
- central government 42.3 32.6 31.4 24.9 17.8 11.1 15.2
Balancing fund for local government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.2 27.5
Subsidy expenditure 1.8 18.3 20.2 28.5 28.9 23.0 12.1
As per cent of GDP
Total debt Service 4.1 4.3 6.0 5.6 5.8 7.8 8.1
External debt service 4.1 4.3 5.2 3.6 2.7 3.3 4.3
Domestic debt service 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.0 3.2 4.5 3.8
Primary fiscal balance (per cent of GDP) 3.6 2.5 1.1 1.4 3.9 2.8 2.7
Fiscal surplus/deficit (per cent of GDP) 1.8 0.1 -2.0 -2.3 -1.2 -3.7 -2.5
Source: Indonesia￿s State Budget and the World Bank.22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
support for IBRA to privatize government banks and
to sell the core assets taken from these banks. There
are also other problems related to governance within
IBRA, as shown for example in the infamous Bank
Bali case. From the liability side, the concern is that
the banks might have been ￿over-recapitalized￿ be-
cause the total bonds issued is perhaps more than
what is needed. The recent asset revaluation proc-
ess conducted by IBRA shows that the book value
of the asset transferred to IBRA could have been
overestimated.
4. Managing domestic debt
In anticipation of the difficulties of most gov-
ernment bonds maturing in 2004￿2009, the Govern-
ment has reprofiled the government bonds that are
now held by various banks, i.e. by starting with the
bonds matured in 2004 by replacing shorter-term
recapitalization bonds with longer-term ones through
exchange offer. By reprofiling the maturity of the
bond, the Government could smooth-out the matu-
rity of the bonds, extend it over longer periods of
time, and avoid a massive debt burden in 2004￿2009.
Without reprofiling the maturity of the bond, the
principal payment of the bond alone would be more
Rp400 trillion during those six years.
Reprofiling only postpones the problem of
managing the debt burden of the Government. For
Indonesia to overcome its domestic debt burden,
there has to be economic growth, and creation of
deep and liquid bond market. Furthermore, the Gov-
ernment should avoid incurring future debt by
ensuring that bank restructuring is completed and
the banking system remains sound through the
introduction and implementation of prudential regu-
lations and oversight.
Unfortunately, growth has stagnated due to ad-
verse external circumstances as well as lacklustre
domestic economic management and political un-
Table 7
THE REAL COST OF BANK RESTRUCTURING
 (In trillion rupiah)
Expected Actual recovery
Items Book value recoverya (up to August 2002)
Total asset transferred 548.3 208.354 111.3
Asset Management Credit (AMC) 275.2 96.32 75.5b
Core/Loans asset from private and state banks 262.4
Non-core assets 12.8
Asset Management Investment (AMI)
(Corporate equity as shareholders settlements) 141.4 76.356 17.8
Bank Restructuring Unit (BRU)
(Net book-value of government investment in
recapitalized and taken over banks) 131.7 39.51 18.0
Total liabilities 703.6 703.6 703.6
Government bond to Bank Indonesia 268.3
Government bond to recapitalized banks 435.3
Total assets ￿ liabilities -155.3 -495.246 -587.9
Source: IBRA and Bank Indonesia data up to December 2001.
a Calculated based on IBRA￿s strategic plan October 1999.
b Including the expected cash receipt from the recent asset fire-sales in June￿August 2002.23 The Indonesian Bank Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons and Implications for other Developing Countries
certainties. Furthermore the bond market is currently
underdeveloped. Since 1 February 2000, the fixed
and variable rate bonds have been traded, but the
volume of transaction remains small. In June 2001,
the cumulative total trading of the government bond
in the market was around Rp56 trillion, which were
still about one-eight of the total recapitalization
bonds. The majority of investors remain the bank-
ing system itself, accounting for about 75 per cent
of the total traded bonds. Bond market development
has been more active since the beginning of 2002,
especially when the central bank started to lower the
interest rate. In mid-2002, the price of the some
traded bonds, especially with 16 per cent coupon
rates, hit a record level of 102. The monthly volume
of transaction also increased from about Rp4 tril-
lion in October 2001 to about Rp10 trillion in May
2002. The recent data in June 2002 show that the
amount of recapitalization bonds that is no longer
owned by the recapitalized bank reached Rp47 tril-
lion or about 11 per cent of total recapitalization
bonds. However, the banking system remains the
major player in the bond market because non-
recapitalized banks hold more than Rp24 trillion of
this Rp47 trillion (Indonesia, 2002).
IV. Remaining issues and problems in
bank restructuring
Despite the progress in rehabilitation and
recapitalization of the banking system, there remain
many challenges and problems. The banking sector
remains dominated by state banks, all of which have
been recapitalized, but which remain weak, or banks
taken over by the state. After the restructuring the
state has become dominant, either through state
banks or because it has taken over or recapitalized
private banks. In fact close to 85 per cent of the total
banking sector third-party liabilities are owned by
the Government with 13 BTOs, 80 per cent of the
seven recapitalized banks under IBRA, and the re-
maining 4 state banks. Whilst the state banks have
been recapitalized and management restructured, the
problem with state banks remain numerous due to
the political pressures.
The rest of the banking system is comprised
mainly of the former large private banks which were
taken over, merged and recapitalized and now com-
prising basically of four banks: BCA, the merged
10 banks under Danamon, Bank Niaga and Bank
Bali. BCA has undergone divestment and Bank Niaga
is also in the process of divestment. However, the
market remains weak and many uncertainties sur-
round the prospects for further divestment, especially
for the state banks. The purely private banks not
under IBRA are made up of 63 small-sized category
A banks. There are now 26 regional development
banks and 50 joint venture banks. The top four for-
eign banks are Citibank, Standard Chartered, ABN
Amro and Hong Kong Shanghai Bank.
The problems faced by the banking sector at
present are three-fold. First, even after the recapitali-
zation, with the exception of a limited number of
banks, the CAR level of most banks are still low and
remain close or below the 4 per cent minimum level.
Any material loan growth would easily lower a
bank￿s CAR level as risk-weighted assets rise and
capital levels stay more or less level. Moreover,
recapitalization has achieved the minimum CAR by
increasing the assets side of the balance sheet with
government bonds, but there is no real cash to in-
crease loans unless the bonds are sold. Should the
economy recover and loan demand increase, banks
would still face a problem of liquidating their gov-
ernment bonds in the secondary market to create
funds for issuing loans. Government bonds still trade
at a discount which, if too large, would in the end
hurt the Bank￿s CAR level. The amount of recapi-
talization in fact was lower than what was needed
then, due to the fact that although the calculations
were made to cover losses up to March 1999, the
actual bonds were issued 3￿4 months later when the
losses had gone up.
Second, earnings are also still low, reflected
by very low interest margins. Banks assets still
largely contain government bonds with low yields
(12￿13 per cent), while deposit rates are slowly
rising with the weakening of the rupiah. The corre-
sponding interest margins are often too low to cover
operational costs.
Lastly, NPL levels remain high, even after the
bad (category 5) loans were transferred to the AMU
in IBRA. The slow economic recovery means that
corporations have not yet been able to significantly
improve their debt service capabilities and thus there
is the likelihood of another round of losses.24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 23
A. Problems and issues
With the economic recovery projected to re-
main at its current ￿muddling￿ pace with a low
growth of 3￿4 per cent, and given the political reali-
ties, bank earnings are not expected to improve
sufficiently to maintain their already low CAR lev-
els. With NPL levels still high, even category A banks
are showing earnings fatigue which, if translated into
declining CAR levels, would imply a need for a sec-
ond round of recapitalization. The question though
is from where the source of this recapitalization forth-
coming? With the government budget already spread
so thin among competing and basic needs, there is
limited government resource available.
This points to the market, and to the question
whether private investors (both foreign and local)
would be likely candidates to increase capital. There
have so far been two divestments ￿ BCA and Bank
Niaga ￿ with the former going to a financial inves-
tor and the latter to a commercial bank from
Malaysia. Thus the role of foreign investors in the
banking sector is likely to be limited and unlike the
experience of the Latin American banking crises,
foreign investors will not be the source of new capi-
tal or a source of better governance, management
and know how. Further consolidation is probably in
order for the Indonesian banking sector, and this
process should not be delayed.
1. Completing restructuring: developing core
banks?
The above discussion points to the facts that
(i) the commercial banking sector remains weak and
under capitalized, (ii) the number of banks still re-
mains above 100 (low franchise value), and (iii) the
state dominates 85 per cent of third party liabilities
of the banking sector. The state banks are still expe-
riencing relatively high NPLs, which could increase
and remain under-capitalized. The situation is not
likely to improve given the uncertainties that con-
tinue to plague economic recovery and corporate debt
restructuring. Another round of cleaning out NPLs
and increasing capital will therefore probably be
required, along with a further consolidation of pri-
vate and state banks in order to establish a number
of sound core banks which would be in a position to
function as financial intermediaries.
The justification for developing a smaller
number of core banks is based on the following rea-
soning. First, given the limited number of qualified
and experienced Indonesian human resources in the
banking sector, fewer banks would allow surviving
banks to get a larger share of this scarce resource.
IBRA has resorted to using foreign bank experts to
enter the management of the banks under its con-
trol, as well as using advisers and consultants.
However, resorting to such means to meet the short-
fall in scarce human resources is likely to be limited,
given the complexities of operating in the Indone-
sian environment. Second, fewer banks would also
ease the burden on the supervisory and monitoring
tasks of the central bank (and the independent su-
pervisory agency in the near future). Third, given
the high fixed cost of developing bank technology,
consolidation would allow more economies of scale.
Fourth, better performance and profitability of ex-
isting banks, and the limit in the number of banks,
would add to the franchise value of the bank and
thereby attract private investors to inject the needed
capital into the banking system.
Consolidation should not be based on deciding
the number of ￿ideal banks￿, or pick winners with
less-than-objective criteria. Consolidation should be
based on incentive based framework and the require-
ments of core banks should be designed in a way to
ensure risk appropriate behaviour and good govern-
ance by the owners, managers and supervisors of
banks. A possible path towards further consolida-
tion could be as follows:
With regard to state banks, it is recommended
that further mergers be undertaken whereby the al-
ready merged state bank, Bank Mandiri, could be
merged with Bank BNI 1946. The NPL are trans-
ferred to AMU in IBRA or a separate subsidiary for
NPL of state banks. The management of the newly
merged state bank should be changed and good In-
donesian expertise put in place in top management.
The elements of good governance over a state owned
bank should also be introduced such as transparency,
disclosure, ensuring independence and proper credit
evaluation for providing loans (without political in-
terference) with outside directorship or statutory
body overseeing the bank, and so on. In order to raise
capital, the Government could inject capital, which
is linked to the change in management. Moreover,
since BNI 1946 is publicly listed, capital could also
be raised in the capital market. Injection of public
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franchise value of banks, will hopefully attract the
interest of private investors.
With regard to private banks, another round of
mergers and consolidations should be encouraged
out of the remaining bulk of the private sector bank-
ing system. The corresponding few core private
banks that emerge will, along with the two or three
strengthened state banks, form the backbone of the
banking system. The remaining 63 smaller private
banks that are not under IBRA should also be en-
couraged to merge and consolidate to perhaps 20 or
30 and classified second-tier or community banks
with a different market segment. The consolidation
of the private banks should be based on the follow-
ing incentive based framework that is given below.
International experience and lessons indicate
that the key elements of an incentive based frame-
work focuses on rules to ensure that core banks are
financially strong and behave in a risk appropriate
way. Important elements would be, first, to link de-
termination of the minimum amount of capital and
capital adequacy requirements (CAR) with increased
risk. For instance it can be required that only core
banks can have a foreign exchange license with high
requirements on capital and CAR (e.g. 15 per cent),
which will in turn encourage further consolidation.
The higher level of capital requirement would im-
ply serious initial commitment of owners and
management who want to be in the banking busi-
ness, and also protect the franchise value of banks
from unfair and imprudent competitors (Bossone and
Promisel, 1998). Additional incentives such as tax
relief for bank mergers can also be provided. The
experience of build up of vulnerabilities pre-crisis,
given the open capital account and rapid pace of fi-
nancial integration, implies that any bank providing
foreign currency services and transactions should be
well equipped to face volatile exchange rate move-
ments.
Second, to ensure there is pressure for bank
management to be subject to good governance, for-
eign exchange banks should be publicly listed. Their
soundness and health ratings by the Central Bank
should be published and made accessible to the pub-
lic. Further, to ensure the appropriate behaviour of
supervisors, the banks should also be rated by both
international and local rating agencies. A similar
approach was adopted in Chile where, other than
government or central bank supervision of internal
risks ratings and valuations of a bank, two independ-
ent private accountancy firms must audit the bank
every year and their findings published. The central
bank is to publish ratings based on capital require-
ments and the quality of the assets of the bank
Third, given the governance problems of asym-
metrical information due to the concentration of
ownership in the banking sector, and the problems
of excessive affiliate or group lending and having
banks act as the owners￿ business group￿s treasury
function, it would be important to have more diver-
sified ownership. As already mentioned, diversifi-
cation of ownership through increased foreign bank
ownership is likely to be limited. Widely dispersed
ownership of banks may also not provide the effec-
tive oversight to banks until enforcement of pruden-
tial regulations are adequate (World Bank, 2001).
Another avenue for diversification of ownership is
through divestment of government shares in banks
through the capital markets or through seeking fi-
nancial investors. The funds raised can then be used
for recapitalization. Given the past problems of ex-
cessive violation of the legal lending limit by busi-
ness groups, a recommendation would be to limit
the share of financial institutions that can be owned
by business groups, as well as the percentage of sin-
gle ownership to less than majority (e.g. 49 per cent
or 25 per cent).
Fourth, banks with foreign exchange licenses
need to have the capacity to manage risk. This im-
plies very strong and proper criteria for evaluating
whether bank owners and managers are ￿fit and
proper￿. Bank Indonesia is at present implementing
such a process.
Fifth, whilst it is not expected that foreign banks
will play a role in recapitalization of the banks, for-
eign banks can bring in the capacity, know-how and
human resources. There is also an expectation that
foreign banks can introduce better governance and
corporate culture.
2. Political economy: state divestiture of assets
and banks
The most difficult problems facing a country
like Indonesia are the political and social constraints
to be able to institute rapid restructuring and reforms
that will strengthen the financial sector. As indicated
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tions rests in state hands. Restructuring has already
involved large losses, and how these losses should
be distributed between the state, taxpayers, credi-
tors, bank owners, borrowers and depositors is not
yet completely resolved. More importantly, restruc-
turing involves the redistribution of wealth and
control, directly through restructuring of assets and
liabilities, and indirectly through taxation and wage
and employment adjustments (Claessens, 1998: 2).
A clear consensus has not emerged in Indonesia with
regard to the role of ownership and control in the
banking sector or banking market between the state
and the private sector, between domestic and for-
eign companies, and between large and small
medium sized corporations. This process is likely to
be politicised still, given also the ethnic dimension
of predominant Chinese ownership of banks and
businesses. Until these issues are resolved, progress
is likely to be slow and will continue to be plagued
by problems and interventions.
V. The way forward: what next?
A. On the IMF rescue package and
conditionalities
1. Bad handling and onerous demands
The intention of the first IMF package was to
demonstrate decisive government action in dealing
with the banking system, which in turn would im-
prove confidence in the remaining banking system.
The experience in providing blanket guarantee in
Thailand, with the closures of the non-bank finan-
cial institutions, led to the limited guarantee scheme,
which in the end caused confidence problems. The
main justification for the IMF assistance programme
was to shore up confidence and to mitigate the dete-
rioration in foreign exchange reserves due to the
massive capital outflows in 1997/1978. The IMF
rescue loan package is linked to an IMF Letter of
Intent (LOI) and the IMF team comes at regular in-
tervals to assess performance and to sign new LOIs.
The IMF LOI that Indonesia has agreed to is very
comprehensive, covering macroeconomic measures
such as base money and fiscal deficit targets, struc-
tural reforms in the real sector related to trade and
investment barriers being removed and financial sec-
tor restructuring. There are also a host of laws,
regulations and institutional changes mandated in-
cluding the independence of the central bank, com-
petition law, bankruptcy law, a bank-restructuring
agency, and a debt facilitation agency.
Indonesia has signed numerous IMF LOIs since
1 November 1997, with each LOI becoming increas-
ingly detailed in terms of targets, timetables, and
guidelines of implementation. This has been due to
the deterioration of relations between IMF and the
Government of Indonesia and the resulting decline
in trust that occurred, especially during the second
half of 2000, up to until recently. Many deadlines
were missed, and the seriousness of implementation
questioned, especially with regard to the transpar-
ency of the debt restructuring of major private sector
obligors and asset sales under the Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency. There have been cases where
former Presidents Habibie and Wahid intervened to
provide for differential treatment for certain debtors
and obligors. The legal and court system have also
been found lacking in their ability to enforce deci-
sions on corruption and bankruptcy, that even when
decisions were made, there have been few actual
sanctions and bankruptcies. The lack of transparency
and discretion has led the IMF to increasingly micro-
manage the LOI by creating oversight committees,
independent committees and so on in an attempt to
overcome the lack of authority and independence of
the IBRA and of ineffective court systems. In one of
the last LOI, corporate governance guiding princi-
ples were introduced and all past agreements are to
be reviewed against these guidelines.
Other than lack of transparency and discretion,
there were also proposals by the Government of In-
donesia that the IMF could not accept, such as asset
securitization of loans, and amendments to the cen-
tral bank law that would allow the removal of the
current board of governors.
2. Changing thinking on IMF conditionalities
The above description shows there were initial
mistakes and unrealistic demands made under the
IMF LOI. Given that Indonesia￿s bank restructuring
remains an ongoing and problematic area of reforms,
there has been much analysis, debate and change in
thinking regarding what should have been done and
what should be done to move forward. The IMF it-
self has undergone introspection that had brought
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it imposes. As is clear from the Indonesian experi-
ence, the reforms and required actions has changed
from general macro and financial targets, to micro-
management. Furthermore, the required actions were
increasingly not just about what policies to under-
take, and institutions to be set up, but also how these
should be implemented with regard to the nature and
terms of contracts that the government has to nego-
tiate with banks and debtors. The shift to micro-
management and implementation issues, especially
with regard to transparency and governance, had a lot
to do with the growing distrust between the IMF and
the Government of Indonesia. However, the approach
was becoming increasingly ineffective, and deadlines
and targets were being continuously missed.
From the above analysis of what was done, and
the results, as well as some alternatives of what could
have been done, it is clear, as has been pointed out
by some, that one ought to be more humble when
providing detailed policy prescriptions to develop-
ing countries where there is no sure theoretical basis
or conclusive empirical evidence to support the op-
timal policy prescriptions (Rodrik, 1999).
The second justification for the types of con-
ditionalities being introduced, including those that
have to do with transparency and governance was,
according to the IMF and the negotiating team of
technocrats of the Government of Indonesia, the need
to instill confidence and thus encourage private capi-
tal inflows. The perception was that the signing on
with the IMF was not just about assistance received,
because much more funds are needed to rescue the
economy. It was to instill confidence so that private
capital (domestic and foreign) flows back in, inter-
est rates come down and the currency strengthens
and stabilizes. Given the confidence issue with regard
to the political commitment of President Suharto,
the reasoning was that transparency, strengthening
financial systems, open markets, and structural re-
forms were necessary to restore market confidence.
However, as has been pointed out, the question
whether the policy prescriptions are the best for the
good of the country, or are those that the IMF be-
lieves will restore market confidence, are two
different considerations. Investors for their part are
heavily influenced by what the IMF, the Treasury
and academic economists say (Rodrik, 1999). In the
case of Indonesia, in the absence of transparency
and information about companies and banks, foreign
investors and creditors relied on the World Bank
country reports. Was sending a signal, that President
Suharto was willing to consider reforms that will
affect his children, was what was needed to restore
confidence? The result was in fact disastrous and a
defiant President increasingly challenged the IMF
and the technocrats who were initially in the negoti-
ating team.
The IMF is now reviewing its conditionality
programme and moving away from micro-manage-
ment towards broader macro and financial targets.
B. Revisiting financial restructuring
The essence of the bank restructuring pro-
gramme pursued by Indonesia under the IMF
programme is to retain and rebuild a viable banking
sector by introducing a combination of measures,
tools, institutions, and incentives so as not to repeat
the same vulnerabilities in the banking sector which
emerged pre-crisis. Thus, the analysis of what should
have been done should be undertaken at two levels.
The first is with regard to reviewing whether there
were alternative solutions that could have brought
about better outcomes in terms of dealing with the
crisis and restructuring. The second is with regard
to the comprehensive programme that is now in place
with the intention of addressing the vulnerabilities
which were evident pre-crisis (as discussed in the
next section).
1. The end game: appropriateness of second
generation Washington consensus reforms.
Does one size fit all?
More than half of the required actions which
Indonesia has to undertake comprise of compliance
to the new rules of the game, or to what has often
been called the second generation Washington con-
sensus reforms. These reforms focus on what has
been perceived as the weaknesses which led to the
vulnerabilities of the banking sector pre-crisis, and
these weaknesses were found in the areas of corpo-
rate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business
and government relations and the need for stricter
prudential regulations and implementation.
The reforms are in turn often linked to interna-
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the Code on Good Corporate Governance, Interna-
tional Accounting Standards and other such institu-
tions. Whilst Indonesia by and large and on paper
has complied with many of these requirements, im-
plementation and enforcement are far from being
realized and because of institutional, legal and po-
litical constraints, may not be satisfactorily imple-
mented satisfactorily in the near future. Furthermore,
the banking sector is still weak and there remains
huge confidence problem which makes it extremely
difficult to phase out the blanket guarantee scheme
currently in place.
In sum the problems amount to distorted in-
centives, inadequate information (asymmetry of in-
formation), inappropriate allocation of responsibili-
ties and poor market infrastructure. The recommen-
dations to respond to date in the post-crisis set of
reforms include complying with international ar-
rangements and standards in order to minimize moral
hazard, to sequence liberalization consistently with
the overall pace of market development and by sup-
porting liberalization with the appropriate incentives
and market discipline.
The risks associated with introducing these sec-
ond generation reforms by developing countries
under the IMF programmes should also be clearly
understood (Rodrik, 2001). First, it reduces au-
tonomy in the formulation of a national development
policy, and asks a country to embark on an untested
model of development, while precluding national
experimentation with other development models.
The interpretation of this risk is not because the ben-
efits of an open capital account, good corporate
governance and strengthened prudential regulations
are not realized; rather, a concerted focus on devel-
oped country norms might be ignoring development
goals which may conflict with those norms.
Second, too much focus on internal reforms
may still not address the issues of systemic risks
within which banks have to operate due to the spe-
cific circumstances and particular fragilities of the
financial sector of developing countries, such as pres-
ently in Indonesia (Goodhart and Delargy, 1998). The
economic environment in which the banks operate
may still be one dependent on a limited set of pri-
mary products, less liquidity in the financial markets,
and subject to more volatile real economic growth,
inflation, nominal and real exchange rate prices,
equity prices and for those with an open capital ac-
count, capital flows and the issue of confidence. As
the crisis has shown, any shock to these variables
will affect the balance sheet of even the sound banks,
as well as corporates, which in turn affect banks.
The effect is even worse for banks with undiversified
portfolios (exposure to sector, particular business
group or region). For instance the banks that did have
an over exposure to real estate developers and were
the worst hit during the crisis. Yet pre-crisis real es-
tate developers were receiving rents in dollars and
thus seemed perfectly hedged for dollar loans. How-
ever, during the crisis distressed corporations simply
did not pay their rent, or could only do so with the
pre-crisis exchange rates.
Developing countries are also smaller and the
concentration and exposure of the economy to cer-
tain sectors or business groups are such that these
countries are less able to absorb the impact from
exchange rate, interest rate or aggregate demand
shocks. Banks also dominate the financial sector in
developing countries leading to high debt equity ra-
tios, and greater fragility of its corporate sector to
interest rate shocks as is clearly perceived from the
Asian crisis.
Third, the World Bank (World Bank, 2001)
points out that the banking sector is in general
fragile because of the intertemporal problem of in-
termediation ￿ accepting money today for some
return in future. There is again all the asymmetry of
information problems that lead to adverse selection
and moral hazard behaviour. The banking sector is
also open to the possibility of contagious deposit runs
which may have begun from insolvent banks, but
could spread quickly to otherwise sound banks. The
financial sector is more fragile in developing coun-
tries because the problem of unavailability and
inaccuracy of information is greater, leading to the
inappropriate risky behaviour and related lending.
A final and very important aspect of the fragility of
a developing country financial sector is that the fi-
nancial liberalization programme, advocated as part
of the Washington consensus, a ￿regulatory and in-
centive environment ill-prepared for a market-based
financial system, and in particular one that encour-
aged or condoned excessive risk taking￿ (World
Bank, 2001: 89).
Fourth, the practicality of being able to under-
take such extensive and comprehensive reforms,
involving setting up regulatory and legal institutions
and independent institutions, which took developed
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points out that ￿Moreover, differences in institutional
development and economic volatility, combined with
the ability of financial market participants to adjust
to regulation, mean that rather than precise forms or
rules, authorities need a strategy for approaching fi-
nancial sector regulation, and the strategy has to go
considerably beyond convergence to industrial coun-
try norms.￿ (World Bank, 2001: 98)
For the banking system, the most important
problems are the lack of a strong and transparent
accounting system which makes it difficult for bank
supervisors to evaluate banks and for banks to evalu-
ate borrowers, often leading to collateral rather than
cash flow based lending. At the same time, the lack
of legal protection for creditors makes it difficult to
collect collateral from borrowers who default
(Goodhart and Delargy, 1999: 103).
Fifth is the prevailing issue of concentration of
ownership in state or private hands. In most devel-
oping countries, banks still dominate the financial
system and the problem of concentration of owner-
ship, whether in state hands or business groups
prevail. Even after liberalization and deregulation,
it is difficult to close down or manage state-owned
banks which are often overexposed to the non-per-
forming loans of state-owned enterprises or private
companies related to the centre of power. In the case
of Indonesia, due to the banking crisis it is estimated
that 85 per cent of ownership is now in government
hands and privatization of government ownership
to date has occurred at a very slow pace. It is ex-
pected that dominant ownership, whether in state
hands or with business groups, is likely to continue
during and after restructuring.
Given these differences between developed and
developing countries, and the wide range of differ-
ences in institutional, economic structure and
political economy features, when assessing what is
best for a country, one must go beyond the ideal
prescriptions based on the second generation Wash-
ington consensus. One size does not fit all. What is
then the ideal set of regulations and rules? Even if
one knows what should be done, knowing how to
get there is altogether another set of issues. Given
the analysis in the above sections, it is clear that what
will be crucial is the synergy between the shorter-
term and longer-term goals of bank restructuring,
and how one should best sequence it. How to ensure
that the long-term goal is the national consensus so
that it will stick? How to design the interim steps so
that all move towards the end goal and not away
from it? Can this be designed? Or is it impossible?
C. Possible approaches for developing
countries
The above analysis on higher risks faced by
the developing countries, due to the dominance of
the banking system, the vulnerabilities to shocks and
concentration of ownership of banks, often leads to
the conclusions that for developing countries, the
need for regulation (and with higher standards) is
even greater, and that externally imposed rules and
ratios to correct moral hazard and lack of incentives
are more important since internal mechanisms are
weak (Goodhart and Delargy, 1998).
However Barth et al. (1999) point out that while
moral hazard problems and lack of incentives for
risk appropriate behaviour have been found to lead
to banking crises, there is no consensus on how to
correct the incentive and moral hazard problems for
banks so as to prevent future crises. For instance it
is far from sure that requiring higher capital adequacy
ratios, stricter definition and provisioning of non-
performing loans, and strengthening and improving
central bank supervision of banks are the most ap-
propriate steps to be taken. This is because of
differences in institutional and legal infrastructure
and capacities, weak bureaucratic and judicial sys-
tems, deficiencies of data making it difficult to make
accurate assessment of financial conditions of
banks or their borrowers, and weak human capacity
which make these reforms not easily or not at all
implementable. Structural differences may also not
make reform frameworks work. For instance, in Latin
America there is evidence that requiring high capi-
tal standards will not necessarily work because of
high levels of concentration of wealth and thin eq-
uity markets to make standards work or effectively
controlled.
Therefore, much more needs to be put into
thinking through an appropriate system for devel-
oping countries. Distinction should be made between
regulation (establishment of specific rules of behav-
iour), monitoring (observing whether the rules are
obeyed) and supervision (the more general observa-
tion of the behaviour of financial firms). There needs
to be a balance between the three for the system to
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to keep regulations, and thus monitoring, simple and
straightforward, and steer away from detailed and
prescriptive regulations (Goodhart and Delargy,
1998). One must be clear on the objective of regula-
tion and institutional structure designed to maximize
meeting the objectives.
Others have recommended an incentive based
system rather than tough and non-implementable
prudential standards and regulations. That is, ￿au-
thorities in emerging markets should focus on using
incentives to harness market forces that favour ef-
fective and efficient financial markets, and employ
individual standards in so far as they contribute to
this purpose￿ (World Bank, 2001: 92). Advocates of
an incentive based system point out that, to resolve
the difficulties in monitoring and enforcing interna-
tional best practices in prudential regulations and
supervision due to weak government capacity and
lack of institutional and legal support, incentive
based reforms that induce good conduct and self-
policing behaviour should be considered. It is easy
to adopt rules and standards, and even pre-crisis,
Indonesia￿s prudential regulations and standards
were already converging to international best prac-
tices. CAR had already been introduced, and an 8
per cent target had been set according to the 1988
Basel Accord. However, implementation and en-
forcement by the supervisory authorities and the
risky behaviour of the regulatory authorities, bank
owners and corporates continued to be prevalent.
The question now is how developing countries,
especially those under an IMF programme, are com-
plying with the established international standards
of regulations, rules, and governance, the required
institutions. However, convergence of developing
country to developed country norms is more on pa-
per, and implementation in reality is still far from it.
On paper, Indonesia has implemented a host of re-
forms and institutional changes, but it is evident from
the analysis above that implementation is still a se-
rious problem and there remains a great deal of
skepticism whether behaviour and norms can change
in the near future. The voluminous information
needed to verify compliance to standards, the lack
of an incentive system and institutional and legal
capacity, mean that developing country norms are
still far from those of developed countries.
What is an incentive based system? An incen-
tive based system is defined as ￿system of rewards
and penalties such that market participants perceive
(correctly) that it is in their own best interest to be-
have in efficient and prudent ways￿ (Bossone and
Promisel, 1998: 15). It is argued that such an ap-
proach is more relevant for developing countries,
which have limited public and private institutions,
and scarcity of information. Incentives that reward
market participants for prudent behaviour (efficient
capital allocation and risk appropriate behaviour)
will in turn promote growth and stability. In fact this
system is along the same line of thought as the pru-
dential regulations and supervision along market
compatible principles, also taking into account ca-
pacity issues, that Goodhart and Delargy advocate
more generally.
The recommended components of such an in-
centive based system, including consideration for
capacity and developing countries, and drawing on
examples include: First, a simple and straightforward
regulation. Given the higher risk that developing
countries face, they should have simple but higher
standards of CAR. There is evidence that higher lev-
els of capital are needed to compensate for volatility
in emerging markets and for exposure to foreign
exchange. A case can be made for higher CAR re-
quirements to be linked to a wider and often riskier
range of activities such as foreign exchange trans-
actions and quality of internal risk management
systems. Many have recommended having capital
adequacy requirements related to bank credit and
market risks such as concentration of bank portfo-
lios in particular sectors and foreign exchange
exposure.
Capital adequacy is only one component of the
soundness of a bank, which needs to be comple-
mented by requirements to ensure the quality of the
portfolio. The important measures are capital net true
provisions for loan losses whose usefulness and ac-
curacy depends on definition used to define
non-performance, accounting standards and proper
information disclosure.
Second is the introduction of portfolio diversi-
fication guidelines such as restrictions on asset
growth, especially with regard to limits on risky lend-
ing, like real estate. This is intended to avoid the
shocks which affect asset prices leading to an im-
pact on the balance sheet of banks.
Third, given the vulnerabilities of not having
adequate supervisory capacity pre-crisis, obviously
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parency requirements, making it accountable and
independent, and strengthening capacity ￿ has been
prioritized. The reality is that, legislating the setting
up of an independent central bank, and having trans-
parency and accountability requirements are not
enough. Improving supervision will be a difficult task
and will require time. Lack of skills can be over-
come with training of supervisors as well as of
managers in the banks themselves, or temporarily
outsourcing if need be. The incentive structure fac-
ing supervisors should also be appropriate. Thus, to
attain effective supervision and enforcement by the
central bank, bank supervisors must be paid well
especially as future reward (i.e. generous pension as
deferred bonus) since misdeeds are difficult to de-
termine immediately.
However, there are more fundamental problems
which are not so easy to resolve. Developing coun-
tries face the problem of creating a framework for a
sound banking system, whilst at the same time try-
ing to create a broader financial system. For instance,
trying to introduce good corporate governance with-
out there being depth in the capital markets. Lack of
liquidity in banks shares, and not a large portion of
the shares being publicly listed means that the role
of the capital markets to complement the monitor-
ing job of supervisors and regulators is missing. Lack
of equity market means that bank owners can meet
capital adequacy through borrowing from their own
or associated banks.
In the transition, one recommendation is to use
the market for short-term bank liabilities as a source
of information and policing device. If the short term
liability market is functioning properly, then the risk
is priced appropriately based on the perception of
the soundness of the bank in question, for instance
through higher interbank borrowing rates. Therefore,
the guarantee on banks￿ third party liabilities and
the implicit or explicit guarantee on banks being
bailed out, or too big or too important to fail, should
also be reduced or removed for the market of short
term liabilities to reflect the information about the
risk profiles of banks. For instance some countries
have also introduced issuance of uninsured and sub-
ordinated debt by banks so that investors will monitor
these banks closely.
Another problem is that banks are still control-
led by vested interests, including the Government
itself. The direction of institutional change is towards
creation of independent institutions. Given weak
supporting legal and political systems, making the
concept ￿independence￿ meaningful is problematic.
The conventional wisdom and direction of other cen-
tral banks is for an independent central bank and the
separation of monetary policy and supervision. The
impact of delegation depends in turn on political
polarization and the structure of agenda setting.
Checks and balances are very important when there
is more polarization. ￿Policy reformers face frustra-
tion if, in the absence of appropriate political insti-
tutions, they grant policy making authority to
formally independent agencies. ￿ Political institu-
tions are crucial to the sustainability and effective-
ness of independent agencies￿. (Keefer and Stasavage,
2000)
Another approach, in addition to the supervi-
sory agency, is to have external monitors of super-
visory bodies as well as banks. For instance requiring
external and private agencies to monitor the regula-
tory institutions, to ensure that potential lack of
independence and weak capacity of regulatory au-
thorities do not undermine the soundness of the bank-
ing sector. Compulsory external audit is one way
such as in Chile, where it is required that two inde-
pendent accountancy firms must audit each bank
yearly and make its findings public. Bank supervi-
sors should also make public thrice yearly its find-
ings on bank compliance. In addition to central bank
supervision and rating of soundness, commercial
banks could also be rated by independent credit rat-
ing agencies (Chile, Argentina, New Zealand).
External monitors that directly monitor banks
would also be another way to strengthen the super-
visory agency￿s monitoring. Even the best supervi-
sors would still find their job difficult because of
information asymmetries and such information prob-
lems affect all stakeholders, creditors, shareholders,
senior bank managers and regulators.
VI. Conclusions
The experience of the Indonesian banking cri-
sis offers the following policy lessons on avoiding
or minimizing the build up of vulnerabilities as coun-
tries integrate with international financial markets.
Financial liberalization needs to be preceded or ac-
companied by strengthening of supporting institu-
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accompanied by enforcement and sanctions for non-
compliance. Financial integration in world financial
markets implies that when exchange rate regimes are
not flexible, prudential supervision of foreign cur-
rency exposures and risks, or at the very minimum
monitoring of the exposures so that there is aware-
ness of vulnerabilities, become crucial. Furthermore
policy makers must be aware and be able to manage
financial-macro linkages which can exacerbate mac-
roeconomic cycles. Concentration of bank owner-
ship makes it difficult to monitor behaviour due to
asymmetric information, and had led to gross viola-
tions of prudential regulations. This implies a need
to reduce dominant single ownership and/or improve
substantially prudential regulations, the qualifica-
tions of owners and managers, and of course corpo-
rate governance norms and regulations to strengthen
information disclosure. Finally, moral hazard prob-
lems are great when there are no clear exit mecha-
nisms, and when there are always bail outs due to
￿too big or too important￿ to fail arguments.
The responses to a financial and banking cri-
sis, as experienced by Indonesia, need to be gauged
carefully. The important lessons here are that liquid-
ity support, and lender of last resort facilities need
to be designed in a way that do not lead to misuse
and are accountable. Furthermore, failure of sterili-
zation of liquidity to absorb excess liquidity will lead
to increased liquidity which fuels inflation and capi-
tal outflows, further weakening the rupiah. Of course
in the case of Indonesia, political realities need to
be considered. The crisis of confidence implied that
the usual relationship between capital flows no
longer held, and high interest could not stem capital
outflow.
The issue of avoiding a crisis of confidence in
managing closures of unviable institutions is a diffi-
cult one, but the Indonesian experience underlines
the importance of ensuring that closures must be
accompanied by a clear explanation to the public
regarding the criteria for bank closures, consistency
in implementation, including a well-defined deposit
guarantee scheme. The deposit guarantee scheme
must be prepared in advance so that it is clear to
depositors that they are able to get their money back
or transfer to quality banks (Lindgren et al., 1999).
Moreover, once there is a massive crisis of confi-
dence, a limited deposit guarantee is not sufficient;
a comprehensive deposit guarantee is needed. How-
ever, it is debatable whether the guarantee should
have been extended to all liabilities of banks.
What are the lessons in bank restructuring?
Since Indonesia is still undergoing the process, the
lessons that are cited herein are preliminary. First,
recapitalization was necessary, but the selection of
bank viability, and the lack of uniform treatment
between state and private banks were questionable.
Furthermore, it would seem that the recapitalization
programme was not linked to a serious restructuring
programme, and as such, the danger and potential of
the need for a second recapitalization has emerged.
Thus, recapitalization alone is not sufficient to at-
tract private equity injection without certainty in the
direction of restructuring, low franchise value, and
uncertainties in implementation of a sound banking
system.
Political interference in the process has been,
and continues to be, a major problem leading to de-
lays and inconsistencies in the restructuring process.
It is clear that restructuring cannot proceed without
the full commitment by Government to support the
agencies undertaking the restructuring. The Govern-
ment could, for example, allow the IBRA sufficient
independence to operate, give it protection from law-
suits and the means to attract the necessary expertise.
Asset valuation of NPLs and other value im-
paired bank assets remain the most difficult and
intractable task of bank restructuring in Indonesia
due to changing economic conditions. Yet it is key
to reducing the fiscal burden of the cost of bank re-
structuring. The key issue is now to properly value
the NPL to avoid bailing out existing shareholders,
undermining private sector recapitalization and
proper governance of banks. Asset disposal has been
centralized in IBRA, but a concensus is not appar-
ent with regard to the strategy of asset sales,
especially with regard to the speed of disposition of
assets, and how to conduct the divestiture of state
ownership in banks taken over or assets taken over.
It is important that valuation of NPLs should be re-
alistic to avoid bailout of existing shareholders,
undermining private sector recapitalization and
proper governance of banks.
With hindsight, the policy lessons of vulner-
abilities pre-crisis and the management of the crisis
are clear. In moving ahead, it is important to be re-
minded of these policy lessons, if the same mistakes
are not to be repeated. It should explain how the
strengthening of the financial structure could be
undertaken in the immediate and longer term. Need-
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sector, which is part of a developed financial sector
is going to take time. It will also require substantial
public resources and significant changes in institu-
tions, regulations and behaviour of the key partici-
pants.
The issues involved, and the possible way for-
ward is evident for Indonesia. However, the magni-
tude of its banking sector and corporate sector dis-
tress being much greater, and since its external debt
also much larger imply that Indonesia already faces
a serious fiscal situation. Furthermore, Indonesia has
the weakest institutional framework for resolving its
banking and corporate sector problems (Claessens,
1998: 4).
Banks are only as good as their customers, as
the saying goes. If we follow this argument, it means
that the effective restructuring of Indonesian banks
can only occur if the local economy recovers. Fo-
cusing on the banks themselves is not enough. The
country￿s economy can only recover if there are new
investments (both local and foreign) coming into the
country. And whenever we talk about attracting in-
vestments, the obstacle in Indonesia right now is
politics, or more aptly political stability which un-
fortunately is in short supply at this early phase of
our democracy. Political differences among the many
ethnic, regional and religious groups, which have
been suppressed for so long, have risen to the sur-
face, all at the same time. Given the inadequacies of
our present political, social and legal institutions that
address these divisive issues, the remedies require
structural changes, which are all long-term in na-
ture. As a result, economic recovery is most likely
to progress at its current slow and ￿muddling￿ pace.
In this situation, the important issue is perhaps not
to be preoccupied with speed, but to keep the re-
structuring momentum going and ensuring it moves
in the right direction.
Notes
1 Including the famous Sumarlin shock whereby Rp8 tril-
lion of State Bank Deposits were converted into Bank
Indonesia certificates (SBI) and interest rates more than
doubled.
2 Finance companies alone borrowed US$ 5.1 billion in
1996, slightly more than 25 per cent of total Indonesian
corporations￿ new debts issuance in the year, jumping
from only about US$ 819 million of new debts issuance
in 1995.
3 Although direct evidence on the credit channel is diffi-
cult to obtain, empirical evidence for Indonesia does sug-
gest that economic activity is found to be more sensitive
to changes in domestic credit than to changes in the money
supply (Ghosh and Pangestu, 1999).
4 Literature on the sequencing of liberalization recom-
mends that the capital account is opened after real sector
and financial sector opening. Indonesia has had an open
capital account since 1969 as part of the rehabilitation
programme of the new order government, and this policy
was never changed.
5 As was experienced by the failed World Bank programme
loan to recapitalize state banks.
6 The initial response of conventional macro stabilization
measures of fiscal austerity and tight monetary policy
leading to high interest rates in a situation of economic
contraction have been criticized heavily. The IMF
changed the strategy to fiscal deficit in the subsequent
IMF LOI.
7 Derivative transactions (other than currency swaps), bank
liabilities to affiliated parties and shareholders of 10 per
cent or more shares in the bank were excluded from this
guarantee.
8 Law No. 10, 10 November 1998, amending Law No. 7 of
1992 on Banking and Government Regulation No. 17, 1997.
9 AMC was set up to restructure and dispose loans and
other assets transferred to IBRA from the closed and
recapitalized banks. AMI is responsible mainly for man-
aging and disposing asset transferred by bank￿s share-
holders in settlement of outstanding liabilities. BRU is
responsible for restructuring banks in general, including
administering government guarantee programme, man-
aging transaction related to bank closure, and supervising
the financial status of banks under IBRA￿s supervision.
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